Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

2013

Fee Effects
Kathryn Judge
Columbia Law School, kjudge@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Bankruptcy Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Kathryn Judge, Fee Effects, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1517 (2013).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1808

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu, rwitt@law.columbia.edu.

Fee Effects
Kathryn Judge
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................

I.

1518

THE FOUNDATION ............................................................................... 1524
A. THE UNDERSIDE OF TRANSACTIONFES ........................................... 1526
B.

EFFECTS.........................................................................................

1530

C.

FRAMEWORK ..................................................................................
i. Influence ...............................................................................

1534

Constraints ............................................................................

1535

2.

1534

II. FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES ................................................................ 1538
A. THE INFLUENCE OFFINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES .............................. 1538

III.

B.

COMPETITION................................................................................ 1543

C.

REPUTATION ..................................................................................

1547

CASE STUDIES ..................................................................................... 1558
A.

HIGH-YIELD DEBT .......................................................................... 1559

B.

MBSS AND CDOs ...........................................................................

IV. RESPONSES ...........................................................................................
A.
B.

1561
1565

PROHIBITION ................................................................................. 1566
OTHER RESPONSES ...................................................................... 1568

1569
Im prove Constraints to Better Align Incentives ................. 1571
1571
a. Regulatory Restraint.........................................................
b. Improve External Constraints............................................ 1572
c. Improve Internal Constraints............................................ 1573

1. Follow the Fees .....................................................................
2.

CONCLUSION .......................................................................................

1574

*
Associate Professor of Law, Columbia University. The author is grateful to Peter ContiBrown, Jeffrey Gordon, Scott Hemphill, Robert Jackson, John Morley, Richard Posner, Alex
Raskolnikov, Robert Scott, and participants at the New York Junior Faculty Forum for helpful
comments on earlier drafts. Priya Merrill, Lena Qiu, and Jennifer Gaudette provided very
helpful research assistance. Special thanks to The William S. Friedman Faculty Research Fund.

1517

IOWA LAWREVIEW

1518

[Vol. 98:1517

INTRODUCTION

It is firmly established that transaction fees act as a friction.'
Transaction costs-the costs two parties incur finding one another,
overcoming information asymmetries, and negotiating the terms of a
transaction-reduce net welfare gains, making it less likely that an otherwise
value-creating transaction will occur. But, preventing transactions from
occurring is not the only impact of transaction fees. Because transaction fees
are revenue to the intermediaries to whom they are paid, intermediaries
prefer transactions that entail greater transaction fees. As a result, in
environments where intermediaries can influence decision-making, high
transaction fees can also increase the probability that a particular transaction
will go forward. This is the "underside" of transaction fees. While pulling in
opposite directions, the two effects of transaction fees are not inconsistent.
The tendency for transaction fees to act as a friction constrains the range of
possible transactions. Parties will not engage in a transaction unless they
believe that the transaction will create value in excess of the associated
costs.2 Oftentimes, however, the requirement of net value creation does not
reduce the range of possible transactions to just one. A company seeking to
raise capital for a new project, for example, may have the option of issuing
new debt in a public offering, issuing new equity in a public offering, or
issuing securities with features of both in a private offering.3 Each mode of
financing may enable the company to obtain the capital it needs at a cost
below the expected value of the project, taking all transaction fees into
account. In such circumstances, the underside of transaction fees comes into
play. Generally, a company seeking capital will work with intermediaries,
including an investment bank and outside counsel, in determining how to
proceed.4 Through the range of transactions they propose, the advice they
provide, and otherwise, the intermediaries can influence which transaction
1.

OLVER

E.

WILLIAMSON,

ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION:

FIRMS,

MARKETS AND POLICY

CONTROL 176 (1986) ("Transaction costs are the economic equivalent of friction in physical
systems."). This Article generally uses the term "transaction fees" to reflect that while the fees
are costs to the principals, they are revenue to intermediaries.
2. The requirement here is only that the parties believe the transaction creates value; not
actual value creation. A variety of factors, including cognitive biases and inadequate or
incorrect information, can cause parties to proceed with transactions that are not welfare
enhancing. See, e.g., infra note 44 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., K & L Gates Practice Guide Editors, Securities Practice Guide Excerpt: Conducting
a PIPE Offering, LEXISNEXIS (Aug. 28, 2009, 2:20 PM), http://law.lexisnexis.com/author-

center/K-&-L-Gates-Practice-Guide-Editors/Conducting-A-PIPE-Offering (examining "some of
the legal and strategic considerations that an issuer conducting a PIPE offering should take into
account during the various stages of the transaction as well as the mechanics of conducting a
PIPE offering").
4.

Bernard S. Black, The Legal and InstitutionalPreconditionsfor Strong Securities Markets, 48

UCLA L. REV. 78 1, 787 (2001 ) ("Most American investors still expect financial statements to be
audited, shares to be underwritten by an investment banker, and the prospectus to be prepared
by securities counsel.").
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is ultimately consummated. And, as profit-maximizing entities, we can
expect that intermediaries will use their influence in a way that serves their
bottom line.5
The claim is not that intermediaries blindly promote the transaction
that yields the highest fees. Intermediary influence is subject to a number of
internal and external constraints. Factors like the value of a good reputation
and competition constrain how intermediaries use their influence. Other
factors, such as the nature of the intermediary's role, can further reduce an
intermediary's capacity to affect which transaction is consummated.
Nonetheless, whenever parties use an intermediary in connection with a
transaction, that intermediary can be expected to seek to maximize its profit
subject to these constraints. As a result, the use of a specialized intermediary
introduces a new market force into the process through which the
transaction is chosen and consummated. This Article explores the
significance of this under-examined market force.
The aim of this Article is twofold. First, the Article draws attention to
the underside of transaction fees as a pervasive phenomenon, present in
every transaction involving an intermediary. Scholars have long recognized
that intermediaries are self-interested actors whose interests do not align
perfecdy with the interests of the parties they assist. They have also
developed a number of helpful conceptual frameworks, including agency
costs, gatekeepers, and two-sided markets, to explain many of the benefits
and costs of relying upon intermediaries. 6 Yet, the overlap between the
underside of transaction fees and each of these alternative frames is
imperfect.7 No other work has yet broadened the lens beyond specific
settings while remaining focused on the way that intermediary influence
affects the probability that a particular transaction will be consummated. In

5. Recognizing that intermediaries seek to maximize profits, not revenue, this Article
uses the underside of transaction fees as a shorthand for the tendency of an intermediary to
favor the transaction that yields the greatest profit. See infra Part I.A.
6. See, e.g., JOHN C. COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 15-47, 55-56 (2006); FINANCE, INTERMEDIARIES, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

(Stanley L. Engerman et al. eds., 2003) (compiling essays that examine the way that the
movement of capital in a particular time and place sheds light on various aspects of financial
intermediation generally); George A. Akerlof, The Marketfor "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 QJ. ECON. 488 (1970); Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a
Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986); Hayne E. Leland & David H.
Pyle, Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and FinancialIntermediation, 32 J. FIN. 371

(1977); Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other Gatekeepers, in
FINANCIAL GATEKEEPERS: CAN THEY PROTECT INVESTORS? 59 (Yasuyuki Fuchita & Robert E.
Litan eds., 2oo6); Daniel F. Spulber, Market Microstructure and Intermediation,J. ECON. PERSP.,

Summer 1996, at 135; Merritt B.Fox, Gatekeeper Failures: Why Important, What to Do, io6 MICH. L.
REV. 1089 (2008) (reviewing COFFEE, supra); Thomas Philippon, Finance vs. Wal-Mart: Why Are
Financial Services So Expensive? (2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.
russellsage.org/sites/all/files/Rethinking-Finance/Philippon-v3.pdf.
7. See infra Part I.C.
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drawing attention to the "fee effects"-that is, the tendency for the
underside of transaction fees to distort the frequency with which particular
transactions are consummated-this Article draws attention to a commonly
overlooked cost associated with the dramatic rise of specialized
intermediaries. Its main contribution to the literature arises from this focus
and the framework it introduces for assessing how great the fee effects are
likely to be in a particular setting. This framing allows us to identify areas
where fee effects are likely to outweigh the benefits associated with reliance
upon a specialized intermediary, thus revealing a market failure. Yet the
same frame also reveals situations where the costs are subtle, and the current
market structural is entirely operational but less efficient than a viable
alternative. Additionally, the proposed frame allows parallels to be drawn
across domains often treated as wholly distinct, such as the sale of insurance
to consumers and the sale of MBSs to sophisticated investors. While not
denying the critical importance of context, the proposed framework allows
us to see that the differences do not entirely swamp the similarities, and
insights from one setting can help to reveal challenges and opportunities in
others. The final value of this framework is that it sheds new light on how
these costs may be reduced.
Second, the Article suggests that there are particular reasons to be
concerned about the influence of intermediaries on the mix of transactions
consummated in capital markets. There are two distinct reasons for concern.
The first relates to the magnitude of the expected fee effects. As an initial
matter, because financial intermediaries often play critical roles in helping
to overcome information asymmetries, connecting investors with capital to
companies in need of it, and establishing the terms upon which such
transfers will occur, they are frequently in a position to exercise significant
influence. Just as importantly, constraints on how intermediaries use their
influence may be less robust in the financial domain than in other areas.
Constraints take two forms. Internal constraints alter the incentive scheme
facing the intermediary, generally by introducing a cost or benefit apart
from the fees it receives in connection with the transaction. For example, an
intermediary will reduce its expected return on a transaction if
recommending the transaction would breach a fiduciary obligation the
intermediary owes to one of the parties and the intermediary may be held
liable ex post for making the recommendation. All other constraints,
including institutional arrangements that limit the range of possible
transactions, are external. The Article suggests that one of the most
significant external constraints, competition, may be less robust in the
financial markets than it is in other domains; and one of the primary
internal constraints, reputation, may be less effective than many presume.
The underside of transaction fees may thus have a greater tendency to alter
the mix of transactions consummated in capital markets than in other
domains.
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The second reason for concern about intermediary influence in capital
markets is that the resulting distortions can have effects that reverberate
beyond the parties involved. In most fields, the fee effects that result are
borne entirely by the parties involved, usually taking the form of a foregone
gain.8 However, when the transaction type in question facilitates the flow of
capital, and (as often arises for historically contingent reasons) the
transaction type tends to be used to facilitate the flow of capital to particular
sectors of the economy or firm types, the underside of transaction fees can
distort the allocation of capital in socially costly ways.9
While the primary aim of the Article is to draw attention to the
underside of transaction fees and the ways this market force affects the flow
of capital, the Article also sheds light on two puzzling phenomena that have
never been fully explained. The first puzzle it addresses is the persistence of
bubbles. This issue has been the subject of extensive debate, and scholars
have provided a variety of theories that help to explain this seemingly
surprising phenomenon. 1o This Article suggests that another dynamic, not
captured in any of the existing frameworks, may also be an important factor
contributing to bubbles. That dynamic is the underside of transaction fees in
a context where a particular transaction type yields higher fees than
alternative transactions and that transaction type tends to be used to fund
specific types of firms or sectors of the economy. Both conditions tend to
arise for path-dependent reasons, and the conditions need not persist
indefinitely for distortions to arise.
As one example, this Article considers how rating agencies, an
important informational intermediary, may have contributed to the real
estate bubble that preceded the 2007-2009 financial crisis ("the Crisis").
The analysis begins with evidence suggesting that rating agencies earned
exceptionally high fees for rating securitization transactions, like mortgagebacked securities ("MBSs") and collateralized debt obligations ("CDOs"),
and that rating agencies used their discretionary authority to inflate the
ratings given to the securities issued in such transactions. Further,
recognizing that securitization transactions were primarily used to funnel
capital to residential mortgages and other real estate loans suggests that the
exceptionally high fees paid to rating agencies on securitization transactions
may have contributed to the real estate bubble that preceded the Crisis. A
corollary is that when firm types or sectors are funded in ways that are less
profitable for the intermediaries involved, such firms and sectors are likely
to receive less capital than is socially optimal.

8.

The foregone gain here is the difference between the surplus that would have been

created had the intermediary made an unbiased recommendation and the surplus created by
the transaction that was actually consummated.
9. See infra Part I.B.
1o.
See infra Part III.
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The second puzzle on which the Article sheds new light is the disparity
between models of how reputational capital should affect intermediary
behavior and first-hand accounts of what actually happens. On one hand,
many economists and other academics have long argued that the value of a
good reputation should ensure that intermediaries generally act honestly
and place their clients' interests above their own." On the other hand, a
series of scandals and other first-hand accounts suggest investment bankers,
credit rating agencies, accountants, and other intermediaries regularly
prioritize their short-term interests in fee maximization, even when doing so
is contrary to their clients' best interests. As with asset bubbles, a number
of explanations focusing on agency costs and other considerations have
been offered to try to bridge this gap, yet the tension between theory and
practice has never been fully reconciled.'3 By more closely examining the
mechanisms through which an intermediary's actions affect an
intermediary's reputation, the Article reveals why many troubling first-hand
stories are not necessarily inconsistent with theory.
More specifically, the Article suggests that a rational intermediary will
discount the expected effect of making a "low-quality" recommendation on
its reputational capital to the extent that the party to whom it makes the
recommendation lacks the means or incentive to determine the quality of
the recommendation it received. A rational intermediary will further
discount the expected effect to the extent that the party lacks the means or
incentive to publicize that it received (and followed) a low-quality
recommendation even if accurately identified. Particularly in settings where
an intermediary can make a reasonably informed judgment about these
probabilities, concerns about reputation cannot be presumed to result in
high-quality recommendations. The Article further shows that the risk is
exacerbated when a class of intermediaries is entrenched and new entry
difficult, as the value of reputation in such settings tends to be determined
on a relative basis. When a party has no choice but to rely upon a particular
type of intermediary, the business will go to the intermediaries whose
reputations are relatively untarnished, no matter how far from shiny that
might be.14 The collective effect of these dynamics can substantially inhibit
the efficacy of reputation as an internal constraint on the underside of
transaction fees.
To complete the analysis, the Article considers regulatory efforts to
reduce fee effects. Fee effects do represent a social cost. Each time an
intermediary uses its influence in a self-serving way, there are gains left on
the table. The difference between the surplus that would have been
2

i1. See infra Part II.C.
12.

13.
14.

See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part II.C.
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produced by the transaction that would have occurred had the intermediary
not been biased and the gains created by the transaction actually
consummated are foregone gains and a social cost. When the transactions at
issue facilitate the flow of capital, fee effects can also give rise to
externalities, further suggesting that intervention may be warranted. And,
even in settings where there are no immediately identifiable externalities,
regulation may be able to facilitate a better outcome than the market will
reach on its own. The decision to rely upon a specialized intermediary is
often a bundled decision, and, taking a dynamic perspective, intermediaries
may use their influence to entrench or alter institutional arrangements in
ways that artificially protect or increase intermediary influence, thus an
arrangement cannot be presumed to be efficientjust because it persists.'5
At the same, there is reason for caution. Fee effects do not, in
themselves, provide a sufficient basis for justifying regulatory intervention.
The reliance that gives rise to fee effects also enables significant value
creation, and the cost savings that arise from relying upon specialized
intermediaries will frequently dwarf the costs identified here. Relatedly, the
ability of intermediaries to earn additional fees in this fashion may help to
sustain institutional arrangements that are more efficient than viable
alternatives. And, efforts to combat fee effects are often imperfect and costly,
even when warranted. Ultimately, whether and how regulators should
respond to fee effects are questions that can only be answered in a contextsensitive way. The Article, accordingly, focuses on the types of responses that
are most likely to be cost justified, while leaving application to future work.
The primary lesson is that policymakers and market participants should
"follow the fees" in order to better understand how an intermediary's
incentive scheme may alter its course of action in ways that do not serve the
interests of the ultimate parties to a transaction. The Article also holds two
lessons regarding how policyrnakers can reduce fee effects. First,
policymakers should examine the ways that regulatory regimes may increase
intermediary influence and, thereby, fee effects. Recognizing the costs
associated with licensing and certification schemes does not mean such
schemes are inappropriate, but it does suggest that policymakers should set
a higher threshold before intervening in ways that foreseeably increase fee
effects. Second, when further intervention is warranted, or already in place,
regulators should consider ways to harness market forces to improve the
robustness of internal and external constraints on intermediary influence
before turning to solutions, like prohibitions, which bluntly alter
intermediary incentives. This could entail promoting price transparency,
promoting competition, and reducing frictions in reputational feedback
loops.

15. Kathryn Judge, Intermediaries and Institutions 1
(on file with author).

(2013)

(unpublished manuscript)
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The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides background. It
introduces the notion of the underside of transaction fees and shows that
this market force has long affected the mix of transactions consummated
even if not formally named. It then illustrates why fee effects are socially
costly, and it introduces a framework for assessing the probable magnitude
of the fee effects that are likely to arise in particular contexts.
In Part II, the focus shifts to the financial markets. Part II addresses
some of the reasons that the underside of transaction fees may be more
influential in this domain than in other areas. It suggests, first, that the
nature of the role played by financial intermediaries and the complexity of
the markets in which they operate may make it particularly likely that
financial intermediaries will be in a position to influence the nature or
frequency of transactions consummated. Second, it uses theory and evidence
to suggest that many financial intermediaries operate in markets that are far
from perfectly competitive, reducing the efficacy of one of the primary
external constraints on the underside of transaction fees. Similarly, it shows
that one of the primary internal constraints-the desire to maintain a good
reputation-may be less effective at aligning the interests of intermediaries
with the parties they serve than simple models would suggest.
Part III provides two case studies of how fee effects may alter the
allocation of capital in troubling ways. It considers how path dependency
can link particular transaction types with sectors of the economy, and how
even temporary conditions enabling an intermediary to earn excessive fees
from a particular transaction type can contribute to bubbles. It uses the
recent real estate bubble, funded in part by MBOs and CDOs, and the
leveraged buyout boom of the 198os, funded in part by high-yield debt, to
demonstrate how this occurs and as evidence consistent with the claim.
Part IV considers the lessons this Article holds for policymakers and
market participants. It begins by addressing the challenge of trying to limit
the underside of transaction fees once intermediaries are entrenched,
showing that attempts to reduce fee effects are often costly and imperfect,
even when warranted. It then lays the groundwork for a path forward. As a
first step, it calls on policymakers and market participants to follow the fees
and better understand how the underside of transaction fees may alter an
intermediary's actions in a given setting. It further suggests that
policymakers consider interventions that increase the quality of the feedback
mechanisms through which intermediaries' recommendations affect their
reputation, and it considers other ways that policymakers may seek to
harness market forces as a way of reducing fee effects.
I.

THE FOUNDATION

The rise of intermediaries and intermediary influence can be traced to
the critical role they often play in helping parties overcome barriers to
transacting. As a society becomes more industrialized and specialized, an
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increasing proportion of the barriers to transacting are bridged by
intermediaries.' 6 As a result, an increasing proportion of transaction costs
take the form of fees paid to a specialized intermediary, rather than time or
effort incurred by the parties to the transaction. Daniel Spulber has
estimated that intermediation contributes approximately twenty-eight
percent of the U.S. gross domestic product ("GDP").17 More recent work by
Thomas Philippon suggests that total compensation for just financial
intermediaries recently reached an "all-time high" of nine percent of GDP.' 8
At least part of the explanation for the magnitude of the role that
intermediaries play in the economy lies in the value they can contribute.,9 As
Spulber describes, intermediaries can provide valuable services in facilitating
price setting and clearing, providing liquidity in the financial markets,
providing immediacy in product markets, facilitating matching and
searching, providing guarantees to address concerns about lemons, and
acting as delegated monitors.20 Framed in terms of recognized transaction
costs, intermediaries provide value by helping parties to overcome
information asymmetries, facilitating their ability to find one another,
creating a bridge between them, and helping to set the terms of the
transaction. 1 Using specialized intermediaries can thus yield significant cost
savings for the parties involved, enabling a wide range of transactions that
transaction costs would otherwise inhibit. This, clearly, is a positive
development on the whole and is but one of the ways our society has

become increasingly specialized. But that does not mean that the effect is
totally benign or without collateral consequence. One effect of this
development is the rise to a class of persons whose interests are best served
by maximizing, rather than minimizing, the transaction fees incurred in
connection with a value-creating transaction.
There are at least two different ways that intermediaries may seek to
maximize their returns in ways that have effects beyond merely altering how
the gains from a trade are allocated. First, intermediaries may advocate or

16.

See generally Spulber, supra note 6 (discussing the role of intermediaries in our

economy).
17.

Id. at 141.

18.

Philippon, supra note 6, at 1.
Cf Judge, supra note 15 (describing ways that intermediaries may alter institutional
arrangements in ways that increase their fees at the expense of efficiency).
20.
Spulber, supra note 6, at 135, 138-39.
21.
Robert C. Ellickson, The Casefor Coase and Against "Coaseanism,"99 YALE LJ. 61 1, 615
(1989) ("[Transaction costs can be divided into three somewhat overlapping functional
categories: (t) get-together costs, (2) decision and execution costs, and (3) information costs."
(footnote omitted)). Coase never defined what constitutes a transaction cost, although he did
endorse another scholar's articulation that transaction costs may be understood as consisting of
"search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs, [and] policing and enforcement
19.

costs." R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 6 (1988) (citing Carl J. Dahlman, The
Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. &ECON. 141, 148 (1979)).
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otherwise promote a transaction because of the fees they will receive in
connection with it. In so doing, intermediaries have the capacity to alter the
numerosity and type of transactions consummated. This is the underside of
transaction fees, and the focus of this Article. Second, intermediaries may
seek to use their influence to entrench or alter institutional arrangements in
ways that maximize their influence and fees over time. I address this
dynamic effect of intermediary influence in other work, showing that
intermediaries may be expected to promote laws, norms, and market
structures that maximize their influence and returns. 22 Moreover, because of
collective action issues and the informational and positional advantages
intermediaries acquire in the process of repeatedly helping parties
overcome barriers to transacting, intermediaries often find some success in
these endeavors. While each phenomenon contributes to intermediary
influence and profitability (and the line separating the two is far from
precise) the two phenomena are sufficiently distinct to merit separate
attention. This Article, accordingly, takes institutional arrangements as a
given, focusing solely on how intermediaries may promote their self-interest
within a given arrangement.
This Part begins by using a simple example to illustrate the prevalence
of the underside of transaction fees and fee effects, and it situates the
Article's claim in relation to other conceptual lenses that have been used to
evaluate intermediary influence. The second Subpart identifies the social
costs of fee effects. The final Subpart completes the overview by providing a
framework for identifying when and how intermediaries use their influence
to affect transaction frequency.
A.

THE UNDERSIDE OF TRANSACTIONFEES

The notion that intermediaries may affect which transactions are
consummated is well understood by market participants. One illustration is
the practice of resale price maintenance ("RPM"). RPM occurs when the
creator of a good requires that an intermediary sell the good at a specified
price. The difference between the price at which the good is sold by the
creator to the intermediary and the price at which the intermediary
subsequently sells it to the consumer is a transaction fee-it is a cost from
the perspective of the creator and the consumer, and a profit to the
intermediary who facilitates the transaction. At first, RPM may seem
puzzling. The profit a creator earns depends solely on the price that it
receives from the intermediary, not the price paid by the consumer. And, if
one assumes that lower prices increase sales, one would expect creators to be
indifferent to, if not pleased by, an intermediary's decision to sell the good
at a lower price. The traditional view of transaction fees operating as a
friction provides an alternative way to frame the puzzle. Discounting by an

22.

Judge, supra note 15, at4.
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intermediary results in lower total transaction fees and thus less friction, an
effect that should seem purely positive from the perspective of the creator
and the consumer.2 3 Nonetheless, RPM is rampant. Creators of goods
ranging from cheap chocolates to high-end handbags have regularly sought
to implement RPM schemes, even in the face of significant legal hurdles.24
This mystery disappears if we recognize, as creators long have, that
transaction fees also act as a grease. By ensuring that intermediaries earn
exceptionally high fees in connection with one type of transaction (here, the
sale of a particular good), the net effect is often an increase in sales of that
good, as intermediaries now have an incentive to promote that particular
type of transaction.25 As Justice Kennedy explained in a recent Supreme
Court decision holding that RPM schemes should be reviewed under a rule
of reason, "[o]ffering the retailer a guaranteed margin... may be the most
efficient way to expand the manufacturer's market share by inducing the
retailer's performance and allowing it to use its own initiative and
experience in providing valuable services.' 6 In other words, when a
consumer enters the intermediary's store interested in buying a particular
type of product, the intermediary now has an incentive to steer the
consumer toward the product on which it will earn the greatest fee, and
away from possible substitutes. The intermediary could do this through a
variety of mechanisms, including product placement and encouraging its
salesmen to favor the product. The key is that the intermediary is now biased
in favor of a particular good for reasons unrelated to its suitability for
particular consumers. While the intermediary has to consider a number of
other factors in determining how actively to steer customers toward the good
protected by the RPM scheme, a fee effect is likely to result-the
intermediary will likely sell more of that good and fewer close substitutes
than it would in the absence of the scheme. And, while consumers may
receive collateral benefits funded by this pricing scheme, another probable
effect is that many consumers will end up acquiring a good that is less suited

23.

Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 896

(2007)

("The

difference between the price a manufacturer charges retailers and the price retailers charge
consumers represents part of the manufacturer's cost of distribution, which, like any other cost,
the manufacturer usually desires to minimize."); id. at 914 (Breyer,J., dissenting) ("[P]roducers
should want to encourage price competition among their dealers . . . [as] doing so they will

often increase profits by selling more of their product.").
24.
Id. at 896 (majority opinion) (addressing the use of RPM by Leegin Creative Leather
Products, Inc., the maker of Brighton handbags); Russell Stover Candies, Inc. v. FTC, 718 F.2d

256, 26o (8th Cir. 1983) (addressing the use of a form of RPM by the maker of chocolates sold
at drugstores).
25. Benjamin Klein, Competitive Resale Price Maintenance in the Absence of Free Riding, 76
ANTITRUST L.J. 431, 464 (2009) (explaining how "[m]anufacturers compete with one another
in the retail distribution marketplace for retailer point-of-sale promotion by offering retailers
increased compensation for their dedicated promotional efforts").
26. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 892.
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to their needs than the alternative good that the intermediary would have
recommended, and the consumer would have bought, had the
intermediary's incentives not been skewed by the promise of a higher fee.
Thus, some portion of the surplus that would have been created in the
absence of the scheme is left on the table.27
Most discussions about RPM schemes focus, understandably, on how
such schemes may be used to both promote and impede competition. While
emphasizing the pro-competitive ways that creators may use such schemes,
Justice Kennedy also recognized, and Justice Breyer in dissent emphasized,
that RPM can also be used in anti-competitive ways.s Academics have
similarly weighed in on both sides of the debate.29 That RPM may be used to
both promote and impede competition, however, is largely tangential to this
Article's claim.o Whether used by a new entrant to gain market share or a
dominant creator to exclude new entrants and thereby preserve market
share, a creator adopts a RPM scheme because it expects that paying higher
fees to the intermediaries distributing its good will favorably alter the total
mix of transactions consummated. Specifically, an intermediary expects that
the frequency of one type of transaction (those involving the sale of the
creator's good) will rise and the frequency of another type of transaction
(those involving the sale of its competitors' goods) will decline accordingly.
RPM thus illustrates the power of the underside of transaction fees to alter
the total mix of transactions consummated.
Market participants, of course, are not the only ones to recognize that
intermediaries are profit maximizing, and that their attempts to maximize
their returns can influence the transactions consummated. In addition to
engaging in a vigorous debate about the motivations behind and effects of
RPM, economists, legal academics, and others have long studied the ways
that intermediaries create value, in the financial markets and elsewhere, and
some of the drawbacks of such arrangements.3' Thus, it is not surprising that
the notion of the underside of transaction fees overlaps with other

28.

See infra Part I.B.
Leegin, 551 U.S. at 894; id. at 910-13 (BreyerJ., dissenting).

29.

See 8 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF

27.

ANTITRUST PRINCIPLESAND THEIR APPLICATION 1620 ( 3 d ed. 2010 & Supp. 2012); see alsoB.S.
YAMEY, THE ECONOMICS OF RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE 5-6, 34 (1954) (describing the use of
RPM by manufacturers to "dispos[e] some distributors more favourably towards their brands"
and thereby "hinder[] the entry of new firms or growth of excluded firms"); John Asker &
Heski Bar-Isaac, Exclusionary Minimum Resale Price Maintenance (May 12, 2011)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/-jasker/WPs.html

(showing

that RPM may be used by "an incumbent manufacturer . . . to exclude a more efficient
entrant[] by increas[ing] the profits of retailers in the event that they refuse to accommodate
entry").
3o . That RPM schemes may be used in both pro- and anti-competitive ways illustrates why
the underside of transaction fees cannot be presumed to be problematic (or benign), but
rather must be examined in context. See infra Part IV.
31.

SeegenerallyAREEDA&HOVENKAMP, supranote 29,

J

1620-1633.
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conceptual frames for evaluating relationships among actors and the
efficiency of those arrangements. Often, for example, the underside of
transaction fees is an agency cost, and many of the circumstances in which
the intermediary cannot be characterized as an agent for either party entail
"two-sided markets." "Two-sided (or, more generally, multi-sided) markets
are roughly defined as markets in which one or several platforms enable
interactions between end-users... [; such] platforms court each side while
attempting to make, or at least not lose, money overall."32 These alternative
frames can help shed light on the circumstances in which the underside of
transaction fees may be particularly influential, how it may help to sustain
efficient institutional arrangements, and how its effects can be lessened
when intervention is warranted.33 Nonetheless, the overlap in each case is
imperfect, as each alternative frame is both under- and over-inclusive when
mapped against the underside of transaction fees.34 More importantly, even
where the overlap is clear, the new lens presented here may shed light on
adverse effects commonly overlooked and introduce new ways of reducing
those effects.35 Agency costs illustrate. Consider an investor seeking advice
regarding how to invest for retirement or a company seeking help
implementing a cash management system that provides both liquidity and a
reasonable rate of return. In each instance, an adviser may be in a position
to propose thousands of options of which twenty might fit the needs of the
investor or company reasonably well and three or four would suit their
32.
Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report, 37 RAND J.
ECON. 645, 645 (2oo6) (footnote omitted).

33. See generally, e.g., id.; Marc Rysman, The Economics of Two-Sided Markets, 23 J. ECON.
PERSP. 125 (2oo9); E. Glen Weyl, A Price Theory of Multi-Sided Platforms, too AM. ECON. REV.
1642 (2010).

34. Agency costs illustrate the imperfect overlap. An intermediary's efforts to encourage a
party to engage in Transaction A-because the intermediary will make more money on
Transaction A-when Transaction B would be better for the party is a clear agency cost
reflecting the overlap. Yet, the same scenario may also give rise to other agency costs, such as a
tendency by the intermediary to do less due diligence than would be optimal from the
perspective of the party, which fall outside the underside of transaction fees. Similarly, the
intermediary will often be in a position that precludes it from being characterized as a pure
agent for either party to the transaction. Finally, there may be circumstances where the
transaction that yields the highest fee for the intermediary is also the transaction that best serves
the other parties involved-perhaps because an innovation enables a much greater surplus
from one transaction than alternatives. In such circumstances, the underside of transaction fees
is still at work, pushing in favor of the transaction that serves the intermediary, but there is no
agency cost. Moreover, in many settings, the nature of the intermediary's role precludes it from
being easily characterized as an agent for either party. Thus, while there is a significant overlap
and fee effects will often represent agency costs, the fit is imperfect.
35.
Compare infra Part IV, with Andrew F. Tuch, Conflicted Gatekeepers: The Volcker Rule and
Goldman Sachs 17 (Wash. Univ. in St. Louis Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 1212-1, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 1809271 (stating
that implicit in the economic study of agency costs is the desirability of the agents acting in "the
best interests of the principal ... [so] principal-agent theory focuses on those mechanisms...
that reduce agency costs and thus promote an agent's loyalty to her principal").
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needs exceptionally well. That an intermediary recommends one of those
three or four options that yields the highest transaction fee is not the type of
agency cost that is easy to identify or rectify, particularly considering this
Article's assumption that transaction costs also remain a friction, so the
parties must believe that the transaction creates value in excess of the
associated fees.
A final point of clarification is that this Article uses the notion of "highfee" transactions to refer to transactions that are in the best interests of the
intermediary facilitating the transaction. Intermediaries seek to maximize
profits, not fees, and the Article focuses on profitability when it is feasible to
do so. Even profitability, however, may be too coarse a metric if too narrowly
measured, as there will often be additional benefits and costs that arise from
a course of dealing that cannot be easily linked to a particular transaction. A
bank holding a portfolio of bonds, for example, may sell particular bonds to
an unsophisticated client because the bank anticipates earning greater
returns by keeping other comparable bonds on its balance sheet. Such an
action would be motivated by the bank's desire to maximize its returns, but
those returns would not be captured in the fees the bank earns on the
transaction. A related challenge is that the difference between an
intermediary's marginal cost and its revenue on a particular transaction may
be great because the intermediary has invested significant fixed costs into
developing expertise or technology that enable it to undertake that type of
transaction with exceptional efficiency. When these fixed costs are taken
into account, intermediaries may not earn excess profits from that line of
business. Nonetheless, once those costs have been sunk and an intermediary
is positioned to earn exceptionally high returns on that type of transaction,
the intermediary will be biased toward that transaction type, potentially
giving rise to fee effects.s 6 The notion of high-fee transactions should thus

be construed as shorthand for the transaction that yields the highest return
for the intermediary.
B.

EFFECTs

The underside of transaction fees may be socially costly in two ways. The
most common way is by altering the mix or frequency of transactions
consummated away from the socially optimal levels. In order to measure this
cost, and to even see it as a cost, it is necessary to choose the appropriate
reference point. Because the Article assumes that a transaction will only
proceed if the parties believe it will create value in excess of the associated
fees, the parties' perceived well-being immediately after a transaction should
exceed their perceived well-being immediately prior to consummation, even
if an intermediary made a highly tainted recommendation. The cost here

36.

This is one of the reasons why the presence of fee effects does not provide a basis for

assuming that an institutional arrangement is suboptimal. See infra Part IV.
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thus takes the form of a foregone gain. More specifically, fee effects can be
measured as the difference between the surplus created by the transaction
and the greater welfare gains that would have been produced had the
37
intermediary not been biased by the underside of transaction fees.
To be sure, even without the underside of transaction fees, the
transaction consummated will often deviate from the one that might yield
the greatest surplus for the parties involved. Reasons other than self-interest
may cause an intermediary to make a recommendation that deviates from
the one that is best for a party. Information asymmetries, the challenge of
identifying a party's type, and the limited number of options an
intermediary typically can understand and readily access all limit an
intermediary's ability to make a perfect recommendation. A consumer who
walks into a wine store, for example, cannot completely and costlessly convey
to the shopkeeper the types of wine she prefers. A short exchange may
reveal that the consumer likes big, Italian reds, but it may not yield the
additional information necessary to discern whether she is likely to prefer an
Amarone to a Brunello, much less whether she is likely to prefer one
Amarone over another. As a result, the shopkeeper will often make
imperfect recommendations for reasons completely apart from the
shopkeeper's economic self-interest. 8 There may seem to be a cost, if one
takes the transaction that creates the maximum amount of surplus as the
relevant reference point, but that cost should, on average, be less than the
additional transaction costs required for the consumer to more effectively
convey her type. More importantly, incomplete information transfers and
other frictions that may affect recommendation quality should not result in
any systematic deviation in the total mix of wines sold.39

The same is not true when the underside of transaction fees enters the
picture. If a particular producer uses RPM or some comparable scheme to
37. In situations where parties have mistaken assessments regarding the value a transaction
will create, fee effects may also take the form of welfare losses. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, The Law,
Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 1073, 11 18-39
(2009) (using insights from behavioral economics to suggest that at least some borrowers
entered into subprime mortgages based on mistaken perceptions and those mortgages were
welfare destroying); infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text (explaining how behavioral
biases can cause consumers to buy insurance products that do not seem to be welfare
enhancing).
38. The costs and imperfect tools for conveying type can help to explain the value of
relationships between an intermediary and a consumer. If a consumer always buys her wine at
the same store, and each time conveys to the shopkeeper her assessment of the last wine she
bought, the shopkeeper will develop a much more nuanced understanding of the consumer's
type. This enables greater surplus from each subsequent transaction, as the shopkeeper can
make significantly more precise recommendations, and the marginal costs the parties incur
conveying and receiving information will go down.
39. Notably, if the person regularly shops at the same wine store and reports back
regarding how much she enjoyed various wines she purchased, the store may come to know
more about her preferences and be able to make recommendations more suited to her type.
This can help explain the stickiness of certain relationships.
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make the sale of its wines more profitable for the wine shop, the shopkeeper
may well recommend that wine more frequently than he otherwise would,
and he is likely to sell more as a result.4o As an initial matter, given the costs
that a consumer would incur going elsewhere, the range of wines the
shopkeeper has available, the consumer's inability to perfectly assess a
bottle's contents by its label, and the shopkeeper's superior understanding
of the wines he stocks, there is a reasonable possibility that once a consumer
enters a wine store seeking a bottle of wine, the shopkeeper will have some
influence over her decision about which one to buy, and the constraints on
how the shopkeeper exercises his influence are likely to be incomplete. How
often the shopkeeper actually makes a biased recommendation will depend
upon a complex calculus which the shopkeeper may tailor based upon the
shopkeeper's assessment of each consumer's preferences, sophistication,
and other factors. Nonetheless, even if the shopkeeper recommends the
high-fee wine only to the subset of consumers whom that wine would
otherwise seem to suit, given their style and price preferences, and even if
only a portion of those consumers buy the wine, the result will be a
systematic shift in the mix of wines that shopkeeper sells relative to the mix
he would sell in the absence of the RPM scheme. He will sell more of the
high-fee wine and proportionately fewer bottles of other wines. Moreover, it
is probable that many buyers of the high-fee wine would have been better off
with the bottle of wine that the shopkeeper would have recommended in the
absence of the RPM scheme. The difference between the surplus that
consumers would have enjoyed had the shopkeeper not been biased by
transaction fees and the surplus that the consumers ultimately enjoyed,
taking into account the excessive sales of the high-fee wine, is the "cost" that
results from the underside of transaction fees. It is the potential welfare
gains left on the table-not the fact that the shopkeeper keeps
proportionally more of the gains created-that make this fee effect socially
costly.
Notably, the existence of fee effects does not itself imply that a party's
decision to rely upon an intermediary is suboptimal. As Ronald Coase has
recognized, "we are choosing between social arrangements which are all
more or less failures."'O The use of specialized intermediaries can result in
dramatic cost savings relative to alternative institutional arrangement.4 2

40. This does not mean that a RPM scheme will always increase sales. For example, a
shopkeeper may determine, because it serves primarily repeat clients, that it is very important
for it to have a good reputation with those clients and the best way to do so is to make only
unbiased recommendations. Another may determine that it wants to maximize volume and it
can best do so by providing the lowest prices possible. Such calculations will be context-specific
and affected by a range of factors outside the scope of this Article.
41. Ronald H. Coase, The Regulated Industries: Discussion, 54 AM. ECON. REV. 194, 195

(1964).
42.

See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
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More generally, intermediaries often provide a variety of services, from
providing advice to storing inventory, for which they cannot directly charge
consumers, so a shopkeeper may need to earn something greater than its
marginal cost on the sale of a bottle of wine, and it may even be reasonable
and necessary for the size of the markup to follow something other than a
linear pattern.43 Thus, the presence of fee effects is not itself a sufficient
basis for assuming that an arrangement is suboptimal. Identifying fee effects
does, however, enable inquiry into whether there may be efficient ways to
reduce this important and often overlooked cost associated with reliance
upon specialized intermediaries.
Also noteworthy is that fee effects need not be net negative. A variety of
factors, including incomplete information and behavioral biases, can cause
parties to err in their judgment regarding the transaction that will create the
greatest welfare gains over time.44 Appropriately designed incentive schemes
targeting intermediaries may thus prove to be an effective mechanism for
"nudging" individuals toward better decisions.45 Nonetheless, the focus here
is on situations where intermediaries' bias arises entirely from their ability to
earn higher fees, apart from any policy scheme to promote good decisionmaking. Thus, the fee effects here identified will tend to be socially costly.
A second way that the underside of transaction fees may affect social
welfare is by giving rise to externalities. In most settings, the probability of
externalities is low, if not non-existent. In the wine-store example, any
welfare loss is likely to be borne entirely by the parties involved in the
transaction, and perhaps the friends with whom a consumer shares the wine
she acquires. The same is not true when the transactions at issue facilitate
the flow of capital. The primary function of the capital markets is to allocate
scarce resources among different projects, ideally based upon the expected
returns of each. When financial intermediaries use their influence to distort
the frequency of a particular transaction type, and that transaction is linked
(often for historically contingent reasons) to a particular sector of the
economy, greater capital will flow to that sector than is socially optimal. At
the extreme, fee effects may thus contribute to bubbles. Similarly, when
firms or sectors are funded in ways that are less profitable for intermediaries,
those firms or sectors may receive less capital than is socially optimal. Such
deficiencies are harder to identify, and potentially somewhat less costly,
because they are less likely to lead to a financial crisis and recession.

43.

See infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text (describing why monopoly type pricing

may be consistent with competition in a variety of contexts).
44.
See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WELFARE, AND HAPPINESS 17-39 (2009).

45.

Id. at 74-82.

1534

IOWA LAWREVIEW

[Vol 98:1517

Nonetheless, if pervasive, these effects could also give rise to real social costs
6
as value-creating projects are forgone for a lack of capital.4
In the next Subpart, this Article provides the basic framework for how
the underside of transaction fees arises and addresses constraints on its
operation. Part II then considers why financial intermediaries may be
particularly influential and the reasons that the constraints on this market
force may be less robust in the financial markets than in other domains. Part
III uses two case studies that are consistent with this Article's claims
regarding the existence of the underside of transaction fees. In addition to
providing support for the notion that the underside of transaction fees can
have powerful effects on shaping the mix of transactions ultimately
consummated, these case studies illustrate why its effects may be particularly
problematic in the financial domain.
C.

RAMEWORK

This Subpart provides a framework for evaluating when transaction fees
will have the tendency to distort the mix of transactions consummated. It
suggests a two-part inquiry. The first step is to identify an intermediary that,
directly or indirectly, has the capacity to influence a party's decision about
whether to consummate a particular transaction. The second step is to
identify and analyze the internal and external factors constraining how the
intermediary uses that influence. This two-part inquiry may be used both to
identify settings where fee effects are likely to arise and to assess the
probable magnitude of those effects in a given area.
i.

Influence

The first inquiry is whether an intermediary has the capacity to
influence a party's decision to consummate a particular transaction. Some
level of influence is probable in almost any setting, as the ability for an
intermediary to add value usually depends upon the intermediary playing a
role in helping the parties to find one another, reducing information
asymmetries, or otherwise bridging a barrier to transacting. Nonetheless, the
level of influence can vary dramatically. As a general matter, the greater the
role the intermediary plays in helping parties to overcome these barriers, the
more influence it will enjoy; and, the easier it is for a party to compare
possible transactions or make an independent assessment of the value of one
relative to others, the less influential an intermediary is likely to be. A person
buying olive oil from a store where she can readily sample the store's
offerings or read reviews from multiple sources describing the various olive

46. The possibility of negative externalities is not limited to finance. See, e.g,,
Bar-Gill, supra
note 37, at 1o83 (explaining how excessive subprime mortgages led to "foreclosure[s], which
impose significant costs not only on borrowers but also on surrounding communities, lenders,
loan purchasers, and the economy at large").
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oils, for example, is likely to be less influenced by the storekeeper's
recommendation that she should buy a particular one than a consumer
lacking this additional information.47 Intermediaries may also derive
influence from a law, norm, or other institutional arrangement that requires
parties to use a particular type of intermediary in connection with a
transaction. While such institutional arrangements often arise because of the
role the intermediary plays in helping to overcome a barrier to transacting,
once in place, such an arrangement can provide an independent basis for
intermediary influence.48
2.

Constraints

Once this threshold is satisfied, the inquiry shifts to factors that
constrain how an intermediary uses its influence. Constraints take two forms.
The first category is internal; that is, constraints that an intermediary
internalizes into its own cost-benefit analysis. These constraints often take
the form of benefits and costs that accrue to the intermediary outside the
immediate context of the transaction. Two of the most significant internal
constraints are potential liability and the effects of an action on an
intermediary's reputational capital. To the extent an intermediary's action
may be deemed unlawful-and the intermediary held liable-the
intermediary will reduce the expected returns on that course of action
accordingly. Ex post liability may arise because the intermediary owes a
fiduciary obligation to one of the parties or because the law prohibits the
intermediary from taking particular actions.49 An action need not be actually
unlawful for potential liability to alter the intermediary's assessment, as
enforcement is inherently imperfect. All that is required is that there is a
reasonable chance that it would be deemed unlawful by a court or relevant
decision-maker.5o The extent to which an intermediary will discount the
expected returns on such a course of conduct will depend on a number of
probabilistic assessments, including the likelihood that the party harmed will

47. Of course, many of the ways an intermediary exercises its influence will be less
transparent. The choice of which olive oils to stock, for example, also meaningfully influences
the consumer's decision about which one to buy.
48. E.g.,Jonathan Macey, The Demise of the ReputationalModel in CapitalMarkets: The Problem
of the "Last Period Parasites," 6o SYRACUSE L. REV. 427, 434-35 (2010) (explaining that while
rating agencies once thrived because they provided valuable information to investors,
regulations mandating the use of ratings and limiting the agencies authorized to provide them
"created an artificial regulatory demand for the services of a small number of favored ratings
agencies," and that demand persisted even as the quality of the information conveyed
declined).
49. See infra Part IV.A.
50.
Louis Kaplow, Burden of Proof 121 YALE L.J. 738, 754 (2012) ("[A]n individual with an
opportunity to commit a benign act will be chilled from doing so when the private benefit of the
act is less than the expected sanction .... ").
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seek recompense, the probability that the action will be deemed unlawful,
and the expected payout upon such a finding.
Reputational considerations, by contrast, can either increase or reduce
the expected return on a transaction depending upon the expected effect of
the action on the intermediary's reputation. Whether positive or negative,
the magnitude of the effect similarly depends upon a number of
probabilistic assessments, including the probability that the party involved
will be able to discern a high-quality recommendation from a low-quality one
and the capacity of the party to broadcast its determination to other parties
with whom the intermediary may work.
The second category of constraint is external. It encompasses
everything else, including institutional and other structural constraints on
the range of possible transactions. One of the most significant external
constraints is competition, which can affect the underside of transaction fees
in a number of ways. Most significantly, competition can reduce, and at the
extreme eliminate, an intermediary's ability to earn anything more than a
competitive rate of return on any possible transaction. Thus, in a perfectly
competitive market, an intermediary has no incentive to favor one
transaction over another. By contrast, if a market is competitive, but less
than perfectly so, deviations become possible, thereby creating an
environment in which intermediaries may prefer some transactions over
others.
If the internal constraints, external constraints, or a combination
thereof are complete-that is, they suffice to ensure that the intermediary
will always act in an unbiased way-then the fee effects will be negligible. At
the same time, the less effective those constraints are, the greater the
probability that the intermediary will use its influence in a way that alters the
transaction consummated. In sum, the combination of the intermediary's
influence and the robustness of the constraints on how it uses that influence
determine the expected fee effects in a given area.
In exploring the factors affecting intermediary influence in the capital
markets and using case studies to illustrate how intermediaries may use their
influence to distort the mix of transactions consummated, Parts II and III
shed additional light on how this framework may be used to assess expected
fee effects. Before moving into applications, however, a few additional
threshold issues merit attention. First, the constraints on the underside of
transaction fees interact, at times reinforcing and at other times
undermining the efficacy of each other. Similarly, factors that constrain how
an intermediary uses its influence may also affect how much influence it has,
in both positive and negative ways. A more competitive environment, for
example, may reduce an intermediary's influence by making it easier for a
party to assess the quality of that intermediary's recommendation and
facilitating the ability of the party to forego working with that particular
intermediary if the party suspects she has received tainted advice. In
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contrast, a fiduciary obligation may create the risk of future liability while
also increasing influence, as the party may be more inclined to trust an
intermediary when she knows that the intermediary has a legal obligation to
act in the party's best interest.
Second and relatedly, the lines separating the inquiries into
intermediary influence and the robustness of constraints on how they
exercise that influence are far from clean. A law prohibiting an intermediary
from making a particular type of recommendation, for example, could be
characterized as an external constraint, limiting the range of options, or an
internal constraint, affecting the intermediary's cost-benefit analysis. While
such characterizations may alter the structure of the analysis, they should
not alter its conclusion. The analysis is separated into a multi-step inquiry to
ensure that all factors likely to influence fee effects are captured. But, so
long as the factors are captured and accurately assessed, how a particular
factor is categorized should have a negligible effect on the conclusion
reached, so there is little value in spending excessive effort demarcating the
bounds among the inquiries.
Third, the intermediary-influence and constraint analyses must be
undertaken in a context-specific and nuanced fashion to yield meaningful
results. Consider, for example, the way that situational monopolies can arise
even in highly competitive settings.5, If an analysis concluded that fee effects
were likely to be low in a given domain based solely upon the
competitiveness of the primary market, the analysis might miss very
significant fee effects. This possibility is illustrated by a number of case
studies from the insurance market provided by Tom Baker and Peter
Siegelman.52 One case study examines the sale of extended warranties on
consumer electronics, such as those commonly sold by Best Buy and other
big box stores in connection with the sale of a TV or stereo. The consumer
electronic market is a very competitive field and these stores do not
generally seem to earn supra-competitive rates of return.53 Nonetheless, the
stores earn monopoly type rents on the extended warranties they often sell

51,

E.g., STEVEN E. LANDSBURG, THE ARMCHAIR ECONOMIST: ECONOMICS & EVERYDAY LIFE

167-77 (1993) (explaining how high-priced popcorn enables movie theaters to charge less for
tickets and may be completely consistent with a competitive market). This is just one of a
number of ways that pricing schemes that may seem problematic may be revealed to be efficient
when collateral benefits are taken into account. See, e.g., George J. Stigler, United States v.
Loew's Inc.: A Note on Block-Booking, 1963 SUP. CT. REV. 152 (explaining how tying can facilitate
price discrimination and the reduction of transaction costs).
52.
See generally Tom Baker & Peter Siegelman, Protecting Consumersfrom Add-On Insurance
Products:New Lessons for InsuranceRegulationfrom Behavioral Economics (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Inst.
for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 13-1, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid= 199569.
53. If anything, they earn, on net, less than they generally need to in order to remain
viable. E.g., Stephanie Rosenbloom, Circuit City Seeks Bankruptcy Protection,N.Y. TIMES (Nov. t o,
2oo8), http://www.nytimes.com/2oo8/II / 1 1/technology/ 1 1 circuit.html.
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in connection with the underlying product.54 In Baker and Siegelman's view,
the "seller['s] ability to charge a situational monopoly price.., provides
ample incentive to push people into buying protection that they don't really
need," and they show that such warranties are sold with a frequency that
cannot be explained in a rational-actor framework and can be only partially
explained once insights from behavioral economics are taken into account.55
Framed in this Article's terms, the difference between the number of
extended warranties that would be socially optimal and the number actually
sold represents a fee effect, and one that would be overlooked without a
6
close analysis of the dynamics surrounding the sale of such warranties.5
II. FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES

This Part addresses the reasons that fee effects may be particularly great
in the financial markets. It begins by considering why financial
intermediaries may be particularly influential. It then examines why two of
the primary constraints on how financial intermediaries exercise their
influence-competition and reputation-are likely to be highly incomplete.
A.

THE INFLUENCE OFFINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES

The degree of an intermediary's influence depends in significant part
on the magnitude of the role that the intermediary plays in bridging the
various hurdles to transacting. The more critical the intermediary's role in
helping to overcome information asymmetries, bringing the two principals
together, and negotiating the terms of the deal, the more influential the
intermediary is likely to be. Financial intermediaries play important roles in
each of these regards, and their influence is often further augmented by the
existence of regulations and market norms mandating their involvement.
The magnitude of the informational asymmetry between an entity or
person in need of capital and those with capital to invest is one of the
greatest challenges impeding the flow of capital.57 A company seeking public
financing, for example, must have a certified public accountant audit and
certify the accuracy of the company's financial statements.s 8 By staking their
54. Robert Berner, The Warranty Windfall, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 19, 2004),
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2004-12-19/the-warranty-windfall (noting that in 2003,
"profits from warranties accounted for all of Circuit City's operating income and almost half of
Best Buy's," and yielded profit margins "nearly 18 times the margin on the goods themselves").
55. Baker & Siegelman, supra note 52, at 44, 45-46.
56. Baker and Siegelman's analysis also illustrates that the range of possible transactions is
constrained by the parties' perception that a particular transaction creates value, not actual
value creation. See id. at 44-47. Part IV returns to this example in assessing possible regulatory
responses.
57. E.g., Bernard S. Black, Information Asymmetry, the Internet, and Securities Offerings, 2 J.
SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 91, 92 (1998) ("In [the author's] judgment, the single largest cost
that stands between issuers and investors is the problem of asymmetric information.").
58. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77f-77g (2006).
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reputation (and more) on the accuracy of a company's financial statements,
accountants play a critical role helping to convince investors that a
company's financial statements are an accurate reflection of its financial
health.59 Investment banks underwriting a securities offering also play an
important role in overcoming information asymmetries, particularly in
connection with initial public offerings, by effectively pledging their
reputation on behalf of the company issuing the securities. 6o Credit rating
agencies, too, play a critical role in this regard. Rating agencies help bridge
information asymmetries by collecting and analyzing an extensive body of
information relevant to the expected performance of a company and
translating that information into a rating that potential investors can readily
comprehend in deciding whether to buy securities issued. In each of these
instances, the intermediary is effective precisely because investors rely, at
least to a degree, on the intermediary's assessment. In addition, each
represents a situation where law or a market norm effectively requires the
parties to use each type of intermediary. As a result, by adjusting the
assessment it provides or its willingness to represent a particular party, an
intermediary can affect the probability that a transaction will be
consummated.
Intermediaries also play a critical role in bringing together investors
with capital and companies in need of it. Many individuals, for example,
work with a financial adviser, like a stockbroker, who makes
recommendations about what types of investments they should hold and
who often effectuates trades on their behalf. Many individuals and
institutions also invest through intermediaries, such as mutual funds, private
equity firms and hedge funds, pursuant to arrangements that give the
intermediary some discretion in how to invest the funds. In each instance,
the intermediary plays a critical role linking (and separating) the investor,
on one hand, and the project in which his money is ultimately invested on
the other.
Companies similarly rely upon intermediaries to help them find suitable
investors. Even well-established public companies generally use an
underwriter when they seek to raise additional funds. 6' One reason is that an
underwriter's relationships with investors can reduce the discount that a
company must offer investors to acquire the securities issued and can

59. COFFEE, supra note 6, at 1o8- 9 1 .
6o. E.g., Randolph P. Beatty & Jay R. Ritter, Investment Banking, Reputation, and the
Underpricingof Initial Public Offerings, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 213 (1986); Richard Carter & Steven
Manaster, InitialPublic Offerings and UnderwriterReputation, 45 J. FIN. 1045 (1990).
61. See Nancy D. Ursel, Rights Offerings and CorporateFinancialCondition, 35 FIN. MGMT. 31,

(2oo6) ("[N]on-underwritten rights offerings are used by firms in poor financial condition
with low net worth, largely as a last resort method for raising equity capital.").
32
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increase a company's access to a broad pool of potential investors. 6
Similarly, because of the extensive regulations and market norms applicable
to securities offerings, companies seeking financing are effectively required
to retain specialized lawyers to assist them in the offering process and the
underwriter (or investor, in offerings not involving an underwriter) will
virtually always do the same. 63 This makes attorneys critical intermediaries in
virtually all securities offerings. 64
Another reason attorneys can play important and influential roles in the
movement of capital is that virtually all investments, from home loans to
venture-capital financings, are done pursuant to agreements drafted by
lawyers. In other words, lawyers can play a critical role in helping parties
overcome the challenge of negotiating and executing a transaction.
Similarly, when an investment bank underwrites a securities offering, it
reduces these expenses by effectively negotiating on behalf of all of the
investors who ultimately acquire the securities issued. And, when an investor
gives his money to an intermediary like a private equity fund, the fund's
sponsor subsequently negotiates on behalf of that investor and others who
have invested in the same fund each time the fund puts money into (or takes
out of) a portfolio company.
There are also many settings where market structures are so firmly
entrenched, by law or otherwise, that a party seeking to consummate a
particular type of transaction has little choice but to work with the
intermediary controlling the relevant structure. For example, an investor
who wants to buy ioo shares of common stock will almost assuredly not seek
to locate a current shareholder and negotiate the terms on his own. Rather,
he will make the acquisition through a centralized exchange, like the New
York Stock Exchange, or through another established arrangement for
matching buyers and sellers. In so doing, the investor will necessarily work
with, and to an extent rely upon, the intermediaries who constitute or
otherwise have access to the established regime. The influence exercised by
intermediaries so positioned is reflected in the capacity of the New York

62. E.g., Brian J. Henderson & Heather Tookes, Do Investment Banks' Relationships with
Investors Impact Pricing? The Case of Convertible Bond Issues 3 (June 15, 20 1s) (unpublished

manuscript), available at http://papers.ssm.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstractid=1546671 ("Our
main finding is that investment banks can add value through their relationships with
investors.").
63. E.g., Subcomm. on the Sec. Law Ops., ABA Section of Bus. Law, Negative Assurance in
Securities Offerings (2oo8 Revision), 64 Bus. LAW. 395, 396 (2009) (stating that "underwriters
have long followed the practice of requiring" company counsel to provide the underwriter with
a negative assurance letter, thereby helping the underwriter establish a due diligence defense
for the purposes of avoiding liability under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933).
64. See COFFEE, supra note 6, at 192-244 (describing the gatekeeping role played by
attorneys in the securities issuance process).
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Stock Exchange, and others, to maintain fixed brokerage fees that far
6
exceeded a competitive rate until policymakers intervened. 5
Taking a step back from the intricacies of particular transaction
structures allows us to see why intermediaries play such a critical role-and
thus can exercise so much influence-in the movement of capital. Consider
the challenges a company would face trying to convince potential investors
that it can be trusted to return their capital, along with a competitive rate of
return, without the aid of a third party to verify the accuracy of the
company's representations. Consider further the challenges the company
would face trying to locate persons interested in the type of investment it has
to offer and negotiating the terms of that investment without assistance.
Today, the movement of capital is a global and highly specialized enterprise.
It may well be appropriate for a young man living in Indiana to invest some
of his retirement savings in a China-based telecom company, but it is hard to
fathom that the two could find each other, much less negotiate the terms of
the investment, without the aid of numerous intermediaries and the
existence of secondary markets maintained by intermediaries. This helps to
explain the degree of influence financial intermediaries enjoy and suggests
that reliance upon intermediaries is likely to persist in the years ahead.
Two final considerations merit particular attention. They are addressed
separately because they bear on all three of the issues examined in this
Part-an intermediary's influence, the efficacy of competition as an external
constraint, and the efficacy of reputation as an internal constraint. The first
issue that cuts across all three categories is the complexity of financial
products and the markets in which they are traded. 66 First, complexity can
increase an intermediary's influence by reducing a party's capacity to
evaluate a product directly, and thus limiting his capacity to independently
evaluate the quality of an intermediary's recommendation. 67 A closely
related issue is that as the complexity of a financial product increases, so too
does the cost of trying to evaluate the product directly.68 Increased reliance
upon an intermediary's assessment can thus provide greater cost savings and
be rational in a greater swathe of circumstances, even if the party has the
capacity to engage in direct evaluation.
65. See, e.g., Hans R. Stoll, Revolution in the Regulation of Securities Markets: An Examination of
the Effects of Increased Competition, in CASE STUDIES IN REGULATION: REVOLUTION AND REFORM 12,
19-29

(Leonard W. Weiss & Michael W. Klass eds., 1981) (describing the ways the fixed-pricing

scheme and associated rules and regulations effectively enabled securities firms to maintain
cartel pricing).
66. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in FinancialMarkets, 87 WASH. U. L.

REV. 211, 212-13 (2009) (identifying complexity "as the greatest financial-market challenge of
the future" and one of the three core causes of the Crisis).
67. John C. Coffee,Jr., What Went Wrong? A Tragedy in Three Acts, 6 U. ST. THOMAS LJ. 403,
409 (2009) (describing MBSs and CDOs as "inherently opaque").

68. See, e.g., Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in FinancialInnovation, Complexity,
and Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657, 684-86 (2012).
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Second, the incredible complexity of many financial products also has
the potential to reduce, at times significantly, the capacity of competition to
eliminate opportunities to earn higher fees from particular transaction
types. When trading a complex product or trading in a complex market, a
party may not be able to readily identify and seek to address inefficiencies
leading to higher fees. Complexity may further reduce competition's
efficacy, as relevant here, by limiting the capacity of parties to compare
products or services offered by different intermediaries. Third, complexity
may also reduce the tendency of concerns about reputation to result in highquality recommendations. In order for a recommendation to affect an
intermediary's reputation, the party must be able to distinguish a highquality recommendation from a low-quality one, and the more complex the
product, the more difficult it will be for a party to discern accurately the
nature of the advice he received.
The second issue that influences all three analyses is relationships.
Relationships often play a significant role in the financial markets, and for
good reason. When a party engages in repeated transactions with the same
intermediary, the intermediary develops a body of information about the
party's preferences, enabling the intermediary to make recommendations
that are better suited to the party while also reducing the costs the
intermediary might otherwise incur trying to discern the party's type.
Switching costs, including the costs that a party would incur trying to find
and learn about alterative intermediaries, can further motivate a party to
continue to work with the same intermediary with whom he has worked
previously.69 Once established, a relationship may increase a party's
tendency to rely upon an intermediary, increasing the degree of influence
an intermediary enjoys in all future interactions with that party. Additionally,
a sticky relationship can increase an intermediary's capacity to increase
prices without losing business, thus facilitating the persistence of price
differentials not correlated to costs. Sticky relationships may also facilitate
intermediaries' ability to engage in interdependent action to increase prices
by reducing the probability that a deviant who lowers prices can quickly
increase its business as a result, again making it more likely that different
types of transactions will vary in their profitability. The importance of
relationships with respect to the area of focus-the efficacy of reputation as
a constraint-cuts in multiple directions. On one hand, each party, costlessly
and inevitably, knows the recommendations that he has received previously
from an intermediary, thereby eliminating the frictions that arise from the
need for communication.7o Recognizing this and taking into account the

69. See generallyJoseph Farrell & Paul Klemperer, Coordinationand Lock-In: Competition with
Switching Costs and Network Effects, in 3 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1967 (M.
Armstrong & R. Porter eds., 2007).
70. See infra Part II.C.
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profits that could be earned over the course of a long-term relationship may
reduce an intermediary's tendency to make a recommendation that is not
fully in the party's interest.7' At the same time, once a relationship is
established, a party may critically analyze the quality of the
recommendations an intermediary provides and how that intermediary's
reputation compares to others as frequently. Hence, powerful relationships
may reduce the efficacy of reputation as an internal constraint.
B.

COMPETITION

Competition is one of the most significant external constraints on the
underside of transaction fees. The primary reason is that an intermediary
operating in a highly competitive market is unlikely to earn much above a
competitive rate of return on any transaction, substantially reducing its
incentive to favor one transaction over another. While not susceptible to any
hard and fast generalizations, many financial intermediaries operate in
markets that are far from perfectly competitive.
As an initial matter, industry structures dominated by a small number of
players and protected by significant barriers to entry are common in the
financial domain. As a result of a series of mergers and a scandal, for
example, there are now only four leading accounting firms. While
corporations can choose to have another accounting firm audit its financial
statements, the strong reputation of the "Big Four," combined at times with
explicit contractual obligations requiring their use, results in the four
leading firms enjoying substantial market share and market power.72 The
situation is even more dire with respect to credit rating agencies. Regulatory
and privately imposed restraints effectively require issuers to seek a credit
rating from at least one, and sometimes more than one, of three designated
rating agencies.73
Commercial and investment banking have also become quite
concentrated. As one source noted, "the global financial market has been
increasingly dominated by a few global, universal banks," and " [t]hese banks

See infta Part II.C.
72. E.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, Too Big to Fail: Moral Hazard in Auditing and the Need to
Restructure the Industry Before It Unravels, io6 COLUM. L. REv. 1698 (2oo6) (suggesting that large
audit firms often believe that they can act with impunity, and recommending alternatives to allow
any auditing firm to fail without disrupting the financial system); Mario Christodoulou, Big-FourOnly
Clauses Are Rare: BBA,
AcCOUNTANCYAGE
(June
18,
201o),
http://www.
accountancyage.com/aa/news/ 1809491 /big-four-clauses-rare-bba (describing, while questioning,
the ubiquity of provisions requiring British banks to use one of the Big Four accounting firms).
The "Big Four" are KPMG, Ernst & Young, Deloitte & Touche, and PricewaterhouseCoopers.
Cunningham, supra, at 1700 & n.3.
73. Partnoy, supra note 6, at 6o ("[C]redit rating agencies have benefited from an
oligopoly market structure that is reinforced by regulations that depend exclusively on credit
ratings issued by Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations .... "); see also COFFEE,
supra note 6, at 284-86 (same).
71.
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also command a substantial market share in virtually all financial markets,
including debt and equity issues."74 There is also evidence that the leading
banks are capturing a growing proportion of the underwriting business, with
the top five banks underwriting 64% of common stock offerings in 2003,
and the top ten banks capturing a full 87%.75 "At the same time, the number
of commercial banks has fallen" dramatically,76 and "[t]he proportion of
bank assets held by the three biggest American banks has tripled since
1994."77 This trend toward consolidation became even more pronounced
following the wave of bankruptcies and mergers that occurred over the
course of the Crisis. In its quarterly report on derivatives, for example, the
Comptroller of the Currency found that at the end of 2010, of the $216.5
trillion in derivatives contracts outstanding with commercial banks, $209.1
trillion, or 96.6%, were with the top five banks (JPMorgan Chase Bank, Bank
of America, Citibank, Goldman Sachs Bank, and HSBC).78 Similar
concentration patterns can be seen in more specialized financial
intermediaries. As described by the FinancialTimes, "[t] he dominance of the
big four providers [of custodian services] is unquestioned. So far ahead of
the field are they ...

that it is apparently the height of futility to aspire to

join their ranks by any means other than by being consolidated into one of
them."79

The "futility," or at least the challenge, of gaining entry into these
markets can be attributed to a number of factors. One reason is that many
financial intermediaries operate in industries where a firm must be licensed
by a regulator before it can engage in a particular activity.so The need for
substantial capital-both in monetary and reputational terms-can further
limit entry.
To be clear, the claim here regarding competition is descriptive, not
normative. Less than perfect competition may be critical to the operation of
74. Sergei Guriev & Dmitriy Kvasov, Imperfect Competition in FinancialMarkets and Capital
Structure, 72 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 131, 132 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citing Charles W. Calomiris, Banking Approaches the Modern Era, REGULATION, Summer 2002, at
14, 14).

75.

Id. (citing data from the Securities Data Corporation).

76. LorettaJ. Mester, Commentary, Some Thoughts on the Evolution of the Banking System and
theProcess of FinancialIntermediation, 92 ECON. REV. (FED. RES. BANK OF ATLANTA) 67, 67 (2007).
77. Buttonwood, Time for a Rent Cut, ECONOMIST (June 3, 20O), http://www.economist.com/

node/1627 4 625 .
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC's QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK TRADING AND
78.
DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES: FOURTH QUARTER 201o, at 16 graph 4 (2011).

79. Brian Bollen, Winners & Losers: Bigger Providers Increase Domination, FIN. TIMES
(Sept. 19, 2011, 12:41 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/o/4bafo47 4 -d7b4-1 seo-ao6b-oot
44

feabdco.html.

8o.

E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 721 1(c)(1)

(2oo6) (describing as among the duties of the newly

created Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, "register[ing] public accounting firms

that prepare audit reports"); id. § 78f (regulating national exchanges and requiring that
membership be limited to registered broker dealers and persons associated with them).
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some of these markets, and increased competition may not always bring
about salutary effects. John Coffee, for example, has drawn attention to the
potential for increased competition among certain financial intermediaries,
like rating agencies, to have adverse consequences, and there is support for
his assessment in other areas. 8,' Similarly, one way to discourage financial
intermediaries whose failure may have systemic repercussions from assuming
excessive risks is by allowing them to operate in imperfectly competitive
markets, thus giving them an incentive to be more risk averse in order to
protect their ability to reap monopoly profits in the future8s The point here
is merely that financial intermediaries often operate in industries where
there are a limited number of market participants and high barriers to
entry, increasing the likelihood that they will be able to earn supracompetitive fees on some types of transactions. When they do, they will be
incented to promote that transaction type.
In addition to looking to the competitiveness of the industries in which
intermediaries operate to discern the probability that intermediaries will be
able to charge a price well above cost in connection with certain types of
transactions, we can also look directly at the prices they charge for their
services. There is evidence that at least some financial intermediaries use
pricing structures that might enable them to earn higher fees on particular
transaction types. One example is for the market to underwrite initial public
offerings ("IPOs"). One study found that "from 1995 to 1998, for the i,i 11
IPOs raising between $20 and $8o million in the United States, more than
90 percent of issuers paid gross spreads of exactly seven percent."3 The
"spread" is the difference between the price at which the underwriter
acquires the securities from the issuer and the price at which it sells the
securities into the market, and hence is the fee the underwriter earns on the
transaction. While there are different theories as to the mechanisms that
enable this pricing scheme, most commentators believe that it enables
underwriters to earn a higher than competitive rate of return, particularly
on the larger transactions.S4 Moreover, more recent studies show that this

81. Coffee, supra note 67, at 415-16 (identifying ways that competition among
intermediaries may have contributed to the Crisis); see also Anil Shivdasani & Wei-Ling Song,
Breaking Down the Barriers: Competition, Syndicate Structure, and UnderwritingIncentives, 99 J. FIN.
ECON. 581 (201 1) (demonstrating that increased competition in the market to underwrite
bonds as a result of the entry of commercial banks led to reduced screening incentives).
E.g., GARY B. GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007, at 156
82.
(2010) (describing this as one benefit of issuing a limited number of bank charters).
83.
Hsuan-Chi Chen & Jay R. Ritter, The Seven Percent Solution, 55 J. FIN. 1105, 1105
(2000).

84.

Id. at ilo6.
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pricing pattern persists despite the fact that more cost-effective solutions
seem like they should be viable.85
Other studies provide further evidence of financial intermediaries'
tendency to compete on non-price terms. In a study of innovative financial
products, for example, Peter Tufano found that the initial "[o]fferings of
,successful' products [that is, products imitated by others,] underwritten
before rival entry have spreads 29 basis points lower than those underwritten
after rival entry."8 6 This means that the fees typically charged for a particular
type of transaction tended to go up as competitors entered the market.
Tufano also found "that as more rivals offer imitative products ... the level
of underwriting spreads does not change."8 7 Yet other evidence shows that
the fees for underwriting high-yield debt during the 198os exceeded a
competitive rate.88 There is also evidence of persistent price differentials in
the mutual fund context, despite there being far less concentration and
thousands of potential competitors.9 While non-price competition does not
alone suffice to establish that intermediaries are earning exceptionally high
profits,9o it does support that conclusion.
Specific features of the environments in which financial intermediaries
operate provide further support for the suggestions that they often operate
in less than perfectly competitive markets and often charge prices that are
not directly linked to their costs. For example, intermediaries whose services
are highly regulated may earn fees slightly in excess of a competitive rate on
some transactions. In addition to imposing a barrier to entry, regulation may
provide a mechanism through which intermediaries can coordinate their
activities, discipline deviants, and work collectively to promote their
interests.9, A closely related issue is that many financial intermediaries
operate in environments where industry participants can observe each
other's behavior and pricing patterns. For example, a public company
seeking to raise funds generally must disclose the fees that it pays to the

85.

See Mark Abrahamson, Tim Jenkinson & Howard Jones, Why Don't U.S. Issuers Demand

European Fees for lPOsi, 66J. FIN. 2055, 2056-57 (201 1) (providing a summary of the authors'
findings and indicating that no favored reason explained the fee differences).
86.

Peter Tufano, FinancialInnovation and First-MoverAdvantages,

25J. FIN. EcON. 213, 227

(1989).
87. Id. at 228.
88. See infra notes 122-28 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 1961, 1988-91 (2010); see alsojones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1429 (2010)
(explaining why the fees charged by mutual fund advisors "may not be the product of

negotiations conducted at arm's length").
9o .

See generally George J. Stigler, Price and Non-Price Competition, 76 J. POL. ECON. 149

(1968).
91.

(1964).

See generally George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. Bus. 117
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intermediaries involved in the offering process.92 Transparency can also be
key to making a system work. The capacity for dispersed NASDAQ market
makers to create a cohesive market, for example, depends upon each
market maker publicly posting, and constantly updating, the prices at which
it is willing to buy and sell a particular stock.03 Even though transparency
may be critical and serve other salutary aims, pricing transparency also
facilitates interdependent action, making it easier for competitors to collude
and thus maintain artificially inflated pricing schemes.94
To be clear, the concern here is not with competition for the sake of
competition; nor is it with the general risk of rent-seeking by intermediaries.
The aim in drawing attention to concentrated industry structures and
pricing patterns is to illustrate why competition cannot be presumed to
eliminate an intermediary's incentive to prefer one transaction over
another. That many intermediaries operate in less than perfectly competitive
environments and compete on non-price terms suggest that financial
intermediaries will often be able to earn a higher fee in connection with a
particular transaction type. That is the only condition required for fee
effects to arise.95
C. REPUTATION
Reputation is a powerful internal constraint on the underside
transaction fees. The long-term success of most intermediaries depends
their ability to attract future business, and their capacity to do so will
significantly influenced by their reputation.96 Reputational capital can
particularly critical in financial markets, where a common explanation

92.

See 17 C.F.R. § 228.5o8(f)

(2oo8)

of
on
be
be
for

(requiring disclosure of all consideration "to be

received by any dealer in connection with the sale of the securities" offered pursuant to that
registration statement); SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, SEC 870, FORM S-s, REGISTRATION STATEMENT
UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, at 4 (2oo8), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/

forms/forms-i .pdf.
93. William G. Christie & Paul H. Schultz, Did NASDAQ Market Makers Implicitly Collude?, 9
J. ECON. PERSP. 199, 199 (1995) (describing the results of their study published at William G.

Christie & Paul H. Schultz, Why Do NASDAQ Market Makers Avoid Odd-Eighth Quotes, 49 J. FIN.
1813 (1994)).
94. Louis Kaplow, An Economic Approach to PriceFixing, 77 ANTITRUST LJ. 343, 398 (201 1)
("Another important factor [in how conducive an industry is to collusion] is the transparency of
prices....").
95. These pricing patterns are also relevant to a related factor that influences the probable
magnitude of fee effects in a particular setting, that is, the elasticity of the demand curve an
intermediary faces. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 11-12, 61-62 (2d ed. 2001); see also
Kaplow, supra note 94, at 400. While elasticity cannot be easily measured, the evidence that
firms often do not compete on price is consistent with the conjecture that financial
intermediaries often face relatively inelastic demand curves.
96. For example, there is a significant body of literature on the important role that
reputation can play in promoting private ordering. See, e.g., Barak D. Richman, Firm.s, Courts,
and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive Theory of Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2328,
2333 n.io (2004).
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the use of many intermediaries, including investment banks, accountants,
and rating agencies, is that the intermediary "pledges" its reputation on
behalf of a party issuing securities.97 For a long time, many economists and
legal academics believed that the value of reputation was sufficiently
important to the intermediaries that they would have little incentive to
recommend low-quality transactions or take other actions that might
jeopardize that reputation. A 1998 review by Jonathan Macey of Frank
Partnoy's 1997 book, F.LA.S. C.O.: Blood in the Water on Wall Street, illustrates
this view, while the book itself embodies the type of first-hand account that
has surfaced with some regularity and that cannot easily be reconciled with
strong assumptions regarding the efficacy of reputation as an internal
constraint.98
In F.I.A.S.C.O., Partnoy describes his experiences working for
investment banks, primarily as a salesperson for Morgan Stanley. The book is
replete with tales suggesting a fairly unconstrained variant of the underside
of transaction fees. Partnoy tells numerous stories involving a client relying
upon Partnoy or one of his colleagues for advice regarding an investment,
their providing advice that serves the short-term economic interests of
Morgan Stanley more than the long-term interests of the client, and the
client taking the advice, often with poor consequences for the client. As
Macey sees it, both F.I.A.S.C.O. and Michael Lewis's Liar's Poker
"characteriz[e] the investment banks as willing and able to take advantage of
their clients' naivete."9o Similar themes were echoed in a recent Op-Ed by
former Goldman Sachs employee Greg Smith, who accused the firm of
sending the following messages to its employees: "persuad[e] your clients to

97. See, e.g., Akerlof, supra note 6, at 496 (demonstrating that one way to deal with the
lemons problem is for an intermediary to distinguish between high- and low-quality versions of
a product and provide a guarantee of quality to a buyer); Randolph P. Beatty, Howard Bunsis &
John R.M. Hand, The Indirect Economic Penalties in SEC Investigations of Underwriters, 50 J. FIN.
ECON. 151, 152 (1998) (finding "that SEC investigations of underwriters impose a variety of
measurable and significant indirect penalties on both underwriters and their clients," which the
authors "attribute . . .to a sudden deterioration in the value of the underwriter's assurancebased reputation capital"); Black, supra note 4, at 786-89 (describing how financial
intermediaries function as "reputational intermediaries" in the securities market); Jonathan
Macey, The Value of Reputation in CorporateFinance and Investment Banking (and the Related Roles of
Regulation and Market Efficiency), J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Fall 201o at 18, 18 (2010) ("The
centrality of the economic theory of reputation to the functioning and success of global
financial markets ...cannot be overstated. The very existence of many of the key institutional
components of the financial world, including credit rating agencies and audit firms, can be
explained only by the theory of reputation."); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the
U.S. FinancialServices Industry, 1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, and IncreasedRisks, 2002 U.
ILL. L. REV. 215, 366 ("The critical importance of reputation can be seen in the advertising
campaigns launched by major dealers in [over-the-counter] derivatives.").
98. Jonathan R. Macey, Wall Street Versus Main Street: How Ignorance,Hyperbole, and FearLead
to Regulation, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1487, 1488 (1998) (review of FRANK PARTNOY, F.I.A.S.C.O.:
BLOOD IN THE WATER ON WALL STREET (W.W. Norton & Co. 1997)).

99.

Id. at 1487-88.
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invest in the stocks or other products that we are trying to get rid of because
they are not seen as having a lot of potential profit"; "get your clients-some
of whom are sophisticated, and some of whom aren't-to trade whatever will
bring the biggest profit to Goldman"; and seek out positions "where your job
is to trade any illiquid, opaque product with a three-letter acronym."l oo
Macey, at the time he wrote the review, found such accounts
implausible. While recognizing that "[t]he time-inconsistency issue" and
agency costs within intermediaries might result in the occasional
"unscrupulous salesman" taking actions contrary to the client's best interest,
he claimed that "[f]rom an economic perspective, Morgan Stanley simply
has too much invested in its reputation to risk it all on short-term profits."0°

Thus, Morgan Stanley and other investment banks "have strong incentives to
police against this kind of conduct."
In so writing, Macey was conveying a
position that was common in economic theory and remains influential.
The pervasiveness of such counterexamples; other scandals, such as the
roles played by accountants, lawyers, and other gatekeepers in the fraud
perpetuated by Enron, WorldCom, and others; the repeated failures by
rating agencies; and many dimensions of the recent Crisis have motivated
Macey and others to explore why theory and reality so often seem to diverge.
In subsequent work, Macey has provided a variety of explanations for why
the reputational model has not performed as expected, including the
mistaken perception that regulation could act as a substitute for reputation,
the tendency of individuals within firms to promote their own reputation
rather than that of the firm for whom they work, and mistaken beliefs by
some intermediaries that they could engage in segmentation, favoring those
clients who did the most business with the intermediary. 103
Other academics have provided additional insight into the reasons that
reputation may not suffice to cause a financial intermediary to act with
integrity and in a client's best interest. Coffee, for example, has explained
how conflicts of interest and flawed incentives contributed to the failure of
accounting firms, law firms, credit rating agencies, and securities analystsall intermediaries of a particular kind, known as gatekeepers-to expose
02

loo. Greg Smith, Op-Ed., Why I Am Leaving Goldman Sachs, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2o12/03/14/opinion/why-i-am-leaving-goldman-sachs.html. This laundry
list nicely illustrates the range of ways that an intermediary may economically benefit from a
particular transaction. Selling an investment that is expected to provide relatively low returns,
for example, helps the intermediary economically not because of the fees that the intermediary
earns in connection with the sale but because a failure to sell the investment would require the
intermediary to continue to hold the investment, thus requiring it to endure directly any
subsequent losses or, even if the investment does not lose money, to forego the greater returns
the intermediary may have earned by using the capital to hold a different, higher returning
investment.
ioi. Macey, supranote 98, at 1502.
102.
Id.
103. Macey, supranote 48, at 429-30; Macey, supra note 97, at 19-21.
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problems at Enron and WorldCom in a timely fashion.104 These failures
occurred even though investors and others relied upon these
intermediaries, and their reputations, in their decisions to provide capital to
these firms. Coffee further identifies an array of factors, including
insufficient intrafirm monitoring of agents, the desire to develop different
reputations in the eyes of different constituencies, and collusive behavior, to
help explain why these important intermediaries act in ways that seem
counter to their long-term interest in maintaining a good reputation. 0 5
These critiques and contributions are sufficient to provide a strong basis for
questioning the extent to which reputation, even if important, may be relied
upon to fully constrain the underside of transaction fees.
At the same time, existing accounts do not fully resolve the tension
between the apparent pervasiveness of intermediaries acting in ways that
further their short-term best interests, even when doing so is counter to the
best interests of the parties they rely on for future business. Given the
importance of reputation as an internal constraint that can help to align an
intermediary's actions with the interests of the parties it serves, exploring
these tensions can shed helpful light on the expected magnitude of fee
effects in a given domain. Complementing the work done by others, the
remainder of this Subpart suggests that much of the apparent tension
disappears if one looks carefully at the mechanisms through which an
intermediary's actions affect its reputation and the way that reputation
translates into future business (the basis upon which reputational capital has
value).
At least two things must occur for an intermediary's action, such as
making a recommendation, to have any effect on its reputation: (1) the
party to whom the recommendation is made must be able to discern the
quality of that recommendation, and (2) the party must broadcast its finding
through a channel that reaches other parties who might rely on that
intermediary's services in the future. To the extent there are frictions
impeding either process, the relationship between the quality of a
recommendation that an intermediary makes and its reputation is
weakened.
A simple hypothetical of an intermediary recommending that a client
invest in a particular financial product illustrates how these frictions may
arise. Consider a situation where an intermediary has the option of
recommending two different investments, a high-quality one that is in the
client's best interest and a low-quality one that yields higher fees yet is also
within the range of options acceptable to the client. Under traditional
assumptions regarding the value of reputation, we should expect the
intermediary to recommend the low-fee, high-quality investment in virtually

104.
105.

COFFEE, supra note 6, at 15-47, 55-56.
Id. at 325-30.
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every instance. The short-term gains from making the low-quality
recommendation are rarely sufficiently great to outweigh the long-term
future revenue stream that the intermediary would place at risk in making
such a recommendation. Now, however, consider the information that the
party possesses and compare it to the information the party requires to
determine whether he received a high-quality recommendation. The
primary information that a party will possess is the subsequent performance
of the investment he acquired. This is an inherently noisy signal.
Investments inevitably entail some risk and uncertainty. High-quality
recommendations will not always perform well and many low-quality
recommendations will end up performing quite well. Even sophisticated
investors can find it challenging to determine the degree to which
subsequent performance
is indicative
of the quality of the
recommendation.to 6 The greater the uncertainty in this regard, the less
likely it is that the investor will modify its willingness to work with the
intermediary as a result of the recommendation or publicize its perception
in a way that affects the intermediary's reputation.
Complicating the scenario so that it more closely resembles reality
accentuates the challenge. First, the choice an intermediary makes is often
not between a high-quality and low-quality recommendation, but between a
subset of reasonably good options, making differences relatively small.
Second, in order to completely assess the quality of a recommendation, a
party must not only have information regarding the investment he pursued
but also the other options available to the intermediary at the time he made
the recommendation, information that the party generally lacks. Third, the
complexity of the product and the various indirect mechanisms through
which a recommendation may be in the pecuniary interest of the
intermediary can make it difficult, and at times impossible, for a party to
determine how the underside of transaction fees may bias the
recommendation it receives, a factor that might otherwise serve as a helpful
flag for parties seeking to discern the quality of a recommendation. Finally,
the value created by relying upon an intermediary dissipates the greater the
resources a party invests in when analyzing the recommendation quality.
A second challenge is that it is costly, for both the party to whom the
recommendation is made and other parties with whom the intermediary
may work in the future, to convey and obtain information about the quality
of service an intermediary has provided in the past. The costs of
communication can take a variety of forms. First, an investor that is itself a
participant in the financial markets may have its own reputation to preserve,

io6. Macey recognizes this as a challenge, but he uses it as a basis for arguing that there is a
place for regulators to police fraud that market participants cannot easily detect, rather than
considering how it may systematically alter the efficacy of reputation as a constraint. Cf Macey,
supranote 97, at 26.
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and thus may not want to harm its reputation by broadcasting that it was
duped by an intermediary. As an example, consider the sale of synthetic
CDO investments in ABACUS 200 7 -AC, which formed the basis of a suit by
the SEC against Goldman Sachs, the intermediary that helped to create and
sell them. According to the SEC, Goldman Sachs failed to make adequate
disclosures regarding the role played by Pauslon & Co., a hedge fund that
had effectively taken a short position in the transaction, in choosing the
reference securities that would determine the value of the CDO
investments.107 At the time the suit was filed, the investors in the securities
had "lost more than $i billion" on their investment. °s Nonetheless, they
had never come out publicly to decry Goldman Sachs' role in selling them
the securities. One reason may be that the two main investors were large,
European banks that had held themselves out as CDO experts and thus had
their own reputations to protect.' 0 9
Second, the challenge of communicating information about the quality
of recommendations an intermediary has made can further impede
successful transmission. Conveying and receiving information are inherently
costly undertakings. A variety of factors, including the medium of
communication and the nature of the distance separating parties from one
another, can affect the magnitude of these costs. In situations where former
and future parties are all members of a community that has a norm of
disclosure and open communication, these costs may introduce very little
friction. By contrast, in a setting where parties are diffuse and each party has
relatively little reason to be worried about the well-being of others, the
friction may be far greater. Ready access to a mode of communicating one's
experience, and the reliability of information communicated through that
mode, can further affect the amount of friction arising from the need for
communication to occur for an intermediary's action to have any general
effect on its reputation. In general, the greater the costs of conveying one's
experience to other potential investors, the less likely it is that an investor
will choose to or succeed in doing so. The intermediary may still lose future
business from that particular client, but such a loss would be less costly than
an adverse effect on its general reputation.
To be clear, these dynamics do not undermine the important role that
reputation can play in reducing fee effects, but they do suggest that a

107.
Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges Goldman Sachs with Fraud in
Structuring and Marketing of CDO Tied to Subprime Mortgages (Apr. 16, 201 o), available at

http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2o1o/2o1 o-5 9 .htm.
io8.

Id.

James Wilson & PatrickJenkins, IKB'sExperienceIs Thin End of the Wedge, FIN.TIMEs (Apr. 19,
11:55
PM),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/o/94dfc1 7 c-4 bf8-i1df-a217-ooi 4 4 feab4ga.html
2010,
(explaining that at the same time it created the entity that acquired the Abacus CDOs, "[IKB]
stated its intention to offer more securitisation services to outsiders and set up IKB Credit Asset
1o9.

Management, an asset management arm").
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different calculation is required. In assessing whether immediate fees justify
a possible adverse effect on reputation, an intermediary will rationally
discount the adverse effect based upon (i) its probabilistic assessment of the
likelihood that the investor will be able to detect the low-quality nature of
the recommendation, and (2) its probabilistic assessment of the likelihood
that the investor will seek to and will succeed in conveying the fact that it
received a low-quality recommendation to other parties who might otherwise
work with the intermediary in the future. Given the importance of a good
reputation to many intermediaries, the degree of discounting will play a
significant role in determining when, if ever, it is in an intermediary's
interest to take such a risk.
Focusing on these feedback mechanisms also suggests bases upon which
intermediaries may "segment" clients that are different from those proposed
by Macey.-° More specifically, to the extent an intermediary believes it can
make relatively accurate probabilistic assessments regarding the likelihood
that a particular client will be able to discern the quality of a
recommendation and the likelihood that the client would have the incentive
and means to communicate its finding, the intermediary may vary the
quality of the recommendation depending upon the client with which it is
dealing. Clients that the intermediary perceives as genuinely sophisticated,
and thus best positioned to discern the actual quality of an investment, and
those viewed as likely to communicate their experience to others, are
rewarded with the high-quality recommendation. Meanwhile, other investors
are effectively penalized, as the intermediary will discount the expected
adverse effect on its reputation of a low-quality recommendation by the
probability of detection and successful publication.
Recognizing these frictions can help to explain many of the situations
where intermediaries make low-quality recommendations. In Boomerang,
Michael Lewis seeks to understand (among other things) why IKB and other
German banks ended up holding such large portfolios of low-quality MBSs
and CDOs, particularly considering that the incentive schemes used to
compensate the individual traders did not seem to encourage risky
acquisitions.' According to Lewis, a common refrain from Wall Street
bankers who worked with the Germans buying the bonds was that the
explanation lies in the "German mentality" or genetic disposition: "It was
form over substance. You work with Germans, and-I can't emphasize this

1 o. A more significant difference is that while Macey concludes that "two-tiered treatment
of customers has proven to be a clear and costly failure," it is less clear that segmentation
according the criteria suggested can be so easily dismissed. Macey, supra note 97, at 2 1.
111.
MICHAEL LEWIS, BOOMERANG 16o-62 (201 1) (noting that while "American bond
traders may have sunk their firms by turning a blind eye to the risks in the subprime bond
market," those traders reaped small "fortune[s] for themselves in the bargain" and "were paid
to put their firms in jeopardy," whereas "German bankers were paid peanuts ...
strongly
suggest[ing] that they really didn't know what they were doing").
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enough-they are not natural risk takers.... So long as a bond looked clean
on the outside, the Germans allowed it to become as dirty on the inside as
Wall Street could make it."112 Even if we assume that Lewis's account is
stylized, these types of characterizations-by the Wall Street bankers who
were selling them-strongly suggest that the financial intermediaries
creating and selling MBSs and CDOs distinguished among their clients in
categorical ways and made different recommendations to them accordingly.
Maintaining the stylized account, the bankers perceived their German
clients to be unsophisticated in a particular way-overly focused on formal
characteristics and disinclined to investigate the underlying substance.
These perceptions were formed through the intermediaries' repeated
interactions with German and other clients, discussions with other similarly
situated intermediaries, and other mechanisms. Once formed, these
perceptions shaped the recommendations intermediaries made-and the
types of transactions consummated-in at least two ways. First, the
perceptions altered the range of possible transactions the intermediaries
chose to propose to their German clients. Perceiving Germans to care more
about form than substance, intermediaries were incented to try to sell them
a greater range of assets that met their formal requirements, primarily, a
AAA-rating, and they were incented to avoid trying to sell them financial
products with similar (or even superior) substantive risk/return profiles but
lacking that demarcation. Second, and more relevant here, the
intermediaries likely discounted the expected effect of recommending a lowquality product to a German bank on its reputation, believing that the
German bank would likely lack the means or inclination to undertake an
independent assessment of the quality of the bond recommended.
Moreover, accounts of this type are common, suggesting that investment
banks and other financial intermediaries are regularly assessing client
sophistication and varying their recommendations accordingly."3
Another consideration often underplayed in standard accounts of the
power of reputation is that the economic value associated with a good
reputation is not solely a product of the quality of one's reputation. The
value of reputational capital lies in the expectation that a good reputation
will affect future deal flow. In settings where parties consistently rely upon a
particular type of intermediary, the economic value of a good reputation
depends primarily upon the quality of an intermediary's reputation relative to

112.
Id. at 164 (internal quotation marks omitted). Other sources corroborate Lewis's
analysis. E.g., Wilson & Jenkins, supra note 1o9 ("Look at any transaction that turned sour
during the financial crisis and there is a good chance there will be a German bank close to the
wrong end of the agreement.... [M]any US and UK bankers like to joke... that the German
bankers doing the deals were naive ....
").
113.
See generally, e.g., MICHAEL LEwis, LIAR'S POKER (201o); FRANK PARTNOY, F.I.A.S.C.O.:
THE INSIDE STORY OF A WALL STREET TRADER 59 (Penguin Books 1999) (1997); GREG SMITH,
WHY I LEFr GOLDMAN SACHS: A WALL STREET STORY ( 2012).
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other intermediaries of the same type. To use a simple example, if the
expected value of future deal flow to a class of intermediaries is $100, the
value of any one intermediary's reputation is capped at $1oo. And the
degree to which its reputation will influence how much of that deal flow it
attracts depends on how it is perceived relative to other intermediaries in
the same class. Thus, if there are only four intermediaries offering a service,
and barriers to entry are high, then the proportion of the $1oo that one
intermediary captures will depend not only on its reputation, but also on the
reputation of the other three intermediaries in the class.
The comparative nature of the process through which an economic
value is placed upon an intermediary's reputation can both accentuate and
diminish the efficacy of reputation as an internal constraint. For example, if
relationships are rare, there is high-quality information about different
intermediaries' reputations, and other intermediaries in the class engage in
high-quality actions and have correspondingly strong reputations, this may
lead to a race to the top. Other factors, like the ease of entry and the
availability of close substitutes for the services that the class of intermediaries
provides, may tend to further accentuate the power of reputation to serve as
an internal constraint, leading an intermediary to make high-quality
recommendations. The same considerations can also pull in the opposite
direction, weakening the capacity of reputation to incent good behavior.
Thus, when parties tend to use the same intermediary without evaluating
alternatives-because there is limited accurate information about the quality
of other intermediaries or an intermediary's competitors have relatively
poor reputations-an intermediary may have less to gain from foregoing
high fees for the sake of building a good reputation. And, again, the more
insulated that class of intermediaries is from outside competition-in the
form of new entrants or close substitutes-the less effective reputation is
likely to be at incenting good behavior.,14 In all cases, reputation may
provide some outer check on how bad the behavior can become, as it is
possible for an entire class of intermediaries to be discredited if their actions
are sufficiently egregious."5 But, given the scandals that have plagued
numerous classes of intermediaries without seeming to undermine their
influence, this outer bound is far from a robust check on behavior.

114.

This may help to explain how financial intermediaries can remain profitable even

though, as Jonathan Macey has highlighted, they generally do not enjoy strong reputations
when compared to other types of firms. Macey, supra note 48, at 447 ("[T]here are no financial
institutions among the top twenty companies in the world when ranked by reputation.... The
list of major U.S. financial institutions that did not even make the list of global companies

ranked by reputation [includes] .. .Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan
Chase, [and] Morgan Stanley.").
115. See id.
at 432-45 (suggesting that certain classes of intermediaries have lost their
influence).
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Again, the comparative nature of the analysis is consistent with
observation. Many of the greatest intermediary failures-like the failure of
Arthur Andersen to expose Enron's accounting shenanigans-arise in
settings that have many of the characteristics suggesting that reputational
damage may not be as harmful to future business as models ignoring this
comparative dimension would suggest.' 6 The behavior of rating agencies
provides a striking example. Reputation clearly matters to rating agencies,
whose ability to add value is contingent upon investors trusting the ratings
they provide to convey useful information about how a security is likely to
perform. Yet, all of the rating agencies have made egregious mistakesincluding missing the problems at Enron and other companies that went
bust around the same time and providing clearly erroneous ratings to MBSs,
CDOs, and other securitized products issued before the Crisis-and those
mistakes have been far from fatal for any of them. Looking at the context in
which they operate in light of the relativistic analysis proposed can help to
explain why this is.l"7 Because of the importance of reputation, market
norms, and legal hurdles to becoming a nationally recognized statistical
rating organization, the field is perceived to have relatively high barriers to
entry and has long been dominated by a small number of participants
(Standard & Poor's and Moody's Investor Service, with a third, Fitch Ratings,
recently joining their ranks)." 8 Additionally, until recently, many investors
were under regulatory and other constraints that effectively required (or
strongly incented) them to buy only instruments rated by one of the three
leading agencies, and other benefits of value to investors (like liquidity)
tended to attach only upon ratings given by one of the leading agencies. As a
result, issuers often feel compelled to work with at least one of the three,
and there are no close substitutes. Finally, because all three rating agencies
have made numerous mistakes, none has been penalized as much as one
might expect in the abstract for those mistakes. If they can only lose business
to one another, then their ability to maintain business depends only upon
their reputation relative to each other. Recognizing that the economic value
of reputation to each of the three is relativistic, rather than absolute, may
thus help to explain why each continues to be a highly profitable, ongoing

116. COFFEE, supranote 6, at 26-29.
117. Again, this explanation complements existing explanations. Partnoy, supra note 6, at
81 (arguing that "the differences between credit rating agencies and other gatekeepers"
include their reliance on outside ratings and their limited liability); see also COFFEE, supra note
6, at 283-316.
1 18. Partnoy, supra note 6, at 6o ("[T]he most successful credit rating agencies have
benefited from an oligopoly market structure that is reinforced by regulations that depend
exclusively on credit ratings issued by Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations
(NRSROs). These regulatory benefits ... generate economic rents for NRSROs that persist even
when they perform poorly and otherwise would lose reputational capital. Until recently, there
were only three NRSROs: Moody's, Standard & Poor's, and Fitch." (footnote omitted)); see also
COFFEE, supra note 6, at 284-85.
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business despite having made grievous errors. It may also help to explain
their willingness to give high credit ratings to debt instruments subsequently
revealed to default far more frequently than their initial ratings would
imply., 19 This example also illustrates that the capacity of industry reputation
to promote good behavior (to avoid the risk that the entire class of
intermediaries might lose its influence) is likely to be weaker in settings
where reliance is entrenched in a law or market norm.
In drawing attention to the significant frictions that can impede the
processes through which an intermediary's actions are reflected in its
reputation, and highlighting the relativistic nature of the value of that
reputation, the aim is not to downplay the importance of reputation to
financial intermediaries. For many types of financial intermediaries,
reputation is critical to enabling the intermediary to play the role that it
does. Making low-quality recommendations based upon probabilistic
assessments of the likelihood of detection or transmission is a risky strategy,
and could lead to an intermediary's demise. Business, however, often entails
such risks. Moreover, that an intermediary takes actions which subsequently
harm its reputation does not provide a basis for assuming that the
intermediary engaged in what Macey deems a "failed" experiment in
segmentation or otherwise erred in its decision-making. , 2o To focus on
situations where we can determine ex post that an intermediary's course of
action proved unprofitable without recognizing that there may be many
situations where intermediaries gained far more than they lost by making
low-quality recommendations ignores selection bias. When making relatively
low-quality recommendations appears likely to yield greater economic
benefits to an intermediary than making high-quality recommendations,
taking into account the probabilistic effect of such recommendations on the
intermediary's reputation and the relativistic process through which that
reputation translates into future revenue, there is no basis for assuming that
a rational intermediary will forego the opportunity to enrich itself at the
expense of the parties it serves even if its reputation is quite valuable.
These dynamics are particularly important to recognize when assessing
the actions of financial intermediaries, as financial intermediaries often
operate in environments where both of the frictions between action and
reputation will be high, and the relativistic process through which
reputation translates into revenue can facilitate herd behavior toward lowquality recommendations. The examples scattered throughout this Part, the
earlier descriptions of the industry structures in which many financial
intermediaries operate, and the incredible complexity of many financial
products and the markets in which they trade all provide reasons to question

119.
For further discussion of how the influence of credit rating agencies may have
contributed to the Crisis, see infra Part III.B.
120.
See Macey, supra note 97, at 29.
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the efficacy of reputation as a mechanism for ensuring that financial
Oftentimes,
recommendations.
high-quality
make
intermediaries
reputational constraints will be sufficiently great to align an intermediary's
incentives with those of the parties with whom it is working. But often is not
always. The analysis here reveals why that gap might be particularly large in
capital markets, and it provides a guide to assessing how effective reputation
is likely to be as an internal constraint on an intermediary's course of
conduct.
III. CASE STUDIES
This Part presents two case studies. Each illustrates how the underside
of transaction fees can alter the mix of transactions consummated and how
this can, in turn, affect the allocation of capital in socially costly ways. The
underside of transaction fees suggests that when financial intermediaries can
earn higher than competitive rates of return for producing a particular type
of financial product, and other conditions are satisfied, the result should be
an overproduction of that type of financial product. One challenge inherent
in trying to determine whether this is in fact happening is finding an
appropriate baseline from which to measure the socially optimal level of
production of a particular financial product. High production alone does
not suffice, as a financial product may be in high demand for entirely
legitimate reasons. This Part attempts to mitigate this challenge by focusing
on situations where, with the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the prices
investors paid for the financial product and the volume created were not
rational in light of fundamentals, i.e., bubbles. More specifically, the focus is
on two recent bubbles-the leveraged buyout ("LBO") boom of the 198os
and the real estate boom of the 2ooos-which were funded in part by
particular types of products-high-yield bonds and securitized products, like
MBSs and CDOs-for which investors overpaid. This does not entirely
overcome the challenge of confounding factors, as there are other
explanations for the existence of bubbles.12 The aim here is not to displace
other explanations, but to draw attention to an additional factor that also
helps to explain the phenomenon and to examine situations that might
provide support for the workings of the underside of transaction fees.

121.
E.g., Jos6 A. Scheinkman & Wei Xiong, Overconfidence and Speculative Bubbles, 11 1 J.
POL. ECON. 1183, 1184 (2003) ("In this paper, we propose a model of asset trading, based on
heterogeneous beliefs generated by agents' overconfidence, with equilibria that broadly fit
these observations. We also provide explicit links between parameter values in the model, such
as trading cost and information, and the behavior of equilibrium prices and trading volume.
More generally, our model provides a flexible framework to study speculative trading that can
be used to analyze links between asset prices, trading volume, and price volatility.").
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HIGH-YELD DEBT

It is widely recognized that there was a LBO boom in the 198os. The
total value of LBO deals went "from less than $1 billion in 198o to a peak of
more than $6o billion in 1988.122 Over this same period, the quality of LBO
deals declined significantly: the average valuation placed on a company
relative to its fundamental value rose while coverage ratios (a measure
indicative of the likelihood that a company will be able to make payments on
debt outstanding as they come due) declined.123 Not surprisingly, LBOs
consummated in the latter half of the decade were substantially more likely
to encounter financial distress than earlier deals.124 Still, the portion of these

deals funded by publicly issued high-yield debt increased over the course of
the decade.125 And, LBO transactions funded by such high-yield debt were
more likely than LBO transactions funded in other ways to face subsequent
financial distress. 26 Moreover, comparing the terms of LBO transactions
during that period with the terms of LBO deals in the more recent LBO
wave, which lasted from 2005 through mid-200 7 , reveals "that debt investors
offered overly favorable terms, particularly too much leverage, in the buyout
wave of the 198os."127 Deals in the 198os generally had equity of ten to
fifteen percent of the deal value, while the equity was around thirty percent
in the more recent boom, providing debt investors significantly greater
8
protection against default.12
A common explanation for the 198os LBO boom, for which Steven
Kaplan andJeremy Stein have provided empirical support, is that the market
for high-yield debt "overheated." According to Kaplan and Stein, "[t]he
success of early deals attracted a large inflow of new money.""19 As "too much
financing . . . chas[ed] too few good deals," the result was that "many
transactions were overpriced, recklessly structured, or both."3o The claim
here does not undermine the overheating hypothesis but it does add an
additional dimension to it. To see the relevance of the underside of
transaction fees, it is necessary to look at the fees paid to the financial
institutions underwriting the high-yield debt that was used to fund these
transactions. Examining the underwriting fees for corporate bonds in the
198os and 199os, Miles Livingston and Glenn Williams found that the

122.
Steven N. Kaplan & Jeremy C. Stein, The Evolution of Buyout Pricing and Financial
Structurein the 198os, to8 Q.J. ECON. 313, 313 (1993).
123. Id. at318-2 9 .
124.
Id. at 351 tbl.IX.
125.
Id. at 337 tbl.VI.
126. Id. at 34 9- 5 5 .
127. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Str6mberg, Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity, 23 J. ECON.
PERSP. 121, 139 (2009).
128. Id. at 138- 4 o.
129. Kaplan &Stein, supra note 122, at 313.
130. Id.
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average fee for a high-yield debt offering in the 198os was 3.5%, a figure
that fell to 2.5% in the 199os.l' Livingston and Williams suggest that the
dramatic decline is most likely attributable to the i 990 bankruptcy of Drexel
Burnham Lambert.IS2 They explain that Drexel first created one of the only
active secondary markets for high-yield debt in the 198os and then used its
prominence in that domain to attract underwriting business.'33 Because of
the expectation that its offerings would enjoy greater liquidity in the
secondary market, Drexel was able to charge a higher than competitive rate
of return for its underwriting services.'34 With Drexel controlling a full half
of the market, other underwriters sought to compete by offering advantages
other than a lower price.,35 The demise of Drexel in 199o led to a more
truly competitive marketplace, which in turn resulted in fees declining from
the excessively high 3.5% to the more competitive rate of return of 2.4%. 36
That there was no comparable drop in the underwriting fees for higher
grade bond offerings during this period, as well as other checks, corroborate
this account.57
This Article's claim regarding fee effects suggests that in the face of the
opportunity to earn supra-competitive fees, underwriters can be expected to
use their influence to increase the number and volume of high-yield debt
offerings they underwrote. The rise in the frequency and size of LBOs
during the i98os, as well as the rise in the proportion of a typical LBO deal
that was funded with high-yield debt, are thus predictable consequences of
the underside of transaction fees. To be sure, the mechanisms through
which underwriters affected the size and frequency of high-yield debt
offerings cannot be observed directly, but there were a number of viable
channels for them to exercise such influence. For example, investment
banks underwriting high-yield debt may have contributed to the demand for
such debt by encouraging investors with whom they had ongoing
relationships to acquire it and encouraging analysts they employed to extol
its virtues.'5 8 Investment banks also may have used their relationships with

Miles Livingston & Glenn Williams, Drexel Burnham Lambert's Bankruptcy and the
131.
Subsequent Decline in UnderwriterFees, 84J. FIN. ECON. 472, 472 (2007).
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There is empirical support for the tendency of investment banks to use their influence
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in these ways, and the success of such efforts can be found in studies looking at the way the
probability a transaction will be consummated is affected by the fee structure used to
compensate an investment bank providing a fairness opinion in connection with the
transaction. See, e.g., P. Raghavendra Rau, Investment Bank Market Share, Contingent Fee Payments,
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buyout specialists to encourage and facilitate the use of high-yield debt to
fund transactions. This account does not deny that the parties on both ends
sought to issue and acquire high-yield debt; but, it does suggest that the
intermediaries who profited so handsomely from these deals may have
played a significant role in contributing to that demand.
The net result is well known-a high number of excessively leveraged
LBO deals, which in turn led to a wave of defaults, followed by bankruptcies
and the challenges and costs of shutting down or reorganizing.139 As this
account highlights, the form that fee effects take is in part a product of the
path-dependent history behind the fees charged on particular financial
instruments and the types of transactions or companies typically funded by
those instruments. It was by no means inevitable that high-yield debt would
produce greater fees for intermediaries than other transaction types. That
the fees charged in connection with the creation of a financial product may
be affected by the history of the product in addition to the costs an
intermediary incurs in creating it is not, however, unique to this instance.1 40
It similarly was not inevitable, nor unique to this instance, for high-yield debt
to be used predominantly in connection with a particular type of
transaction-the LBO. Nonetheless, once these conditions were in place,
the foundation was laid for the underside of transaction fees to lead to the
overproduction of high-yield debt and an excessive amount of capital
flowing into LBOs. Moreover, as this example also illustrates, such
conditions need not persist for capital to be misallocated. While the market
may eventually eliminate most such instances, significant distortions can
arise in the period before the market self-corrects.
B.

MBSs AND CDOs

A more recent example of an excessive flow of capital to a particular
market sector is the proliferation of MBSs and CDOs in the years leading up
to the Crisis. MBSs and CDOs are securitization transactions in which a pool
of assets (mortgages and debt instruments, respectively) are bundled
together and placed into a newly created entity. The entity simultaneously
issues multiple classes of securities with different rights to the cash flows
from the underlying assets. The securities are rated by a credit rating agency
based upon their expected performance. Because of the complexity of the

earned by the acquiror over a 6-18 month period after the completion of the tender offer.");

David A. Becher, Jonathan B. Cohn &Jennifer L. Juergens, Do Stock Analysts Influence Merger
Completion? An Examination of Post-Merger Announcement Recommendations 27, 39 tbl.VIII
(June 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract--1566991 ("[T]he
evidence presented supports the argument that [stock] analyst recommendations... influence the
likelihood of merger completion....").
139. E.g., Ursel, supra note 61, at 32 ("[I]n the 199os ... corporate financial bankruptcies
soared.").
140. See supra Part II.A.
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transaction structures, the process of putting these deals together required
numerous intermediaries, each of whom received significant fees for their
services. The analysis here focuses on just one, which played a particularly
critical role: credit rating agencies.
By way of background, securities rated AAA tend to be valued at a slight
premium relative to their expected rate of default. This has been credited to
a variety of factors, including regulatory constraints that encourage (and
sometimes mandate) regulated entities to hold securities with a AAA rating
and the tendency for AAA-rated securities to be more liquid than lower
rated ones.'4' Additionally, a AAA rating signifies that the credit rating
agency believes that there is an exceptionally low probability that the
security will default, making them informationally insensitive and reducing
the need for an investor to engage in due diligence to understand the risk of
what he is acquiring.42 As a result, as the proportion of AAA-rated securities
issued in a transaction increases, so too does the aggregate amount investors
are willing to pay for the securities issued. That, in turn, increases the
probability that the securities issued will be worth more than the assets
underlying the transaction and the costs of putting it together, the condition
that must be met to consummate a transaction. In other words, by
consistently giving a AAA rating to a sizeable portion of the securities issued
in a particular type of transaction, credit rating agencies can effectively
encourage the consummation of that type of transaction. As a result, even
though credit rating agencies do not have any direct control in determining
the types of transactions consummated, they have significant capacity to
affect such decisions indirectly through their relative willingness to bestow
AAA ratings on the securities issued.
There is evidence that the credit rating agencies did precisely this with
respect to complex securitization transactions leading up to the Crisis. John
Griffin and Dragon Yongjun Tang examined the ratings given to CDOs
issued between 1997 and 2007.'43 Griffin and Tang found that the actual
ratings the credit rating agencies gave to securities issued in these
transactions frequently deviated from the ratings dictated by the rating
agency's model.'44 These deviations are attributable to discretionary

141.

E.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL
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IN THE UNITED STATES 1 18-20 (201 1) [hereinafter INQUIRY REPORT].
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8,
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(2009), available at http://www.moodys.com/sites/products/AboutMoodysRatingsAttachments/
MoodysRatingsSymbolsand%2oDefinitions.pdf ("Obligations rated Aaa are judged to be of the
highest quality, with minimal credit risk."); see
also GORTON, supra note 82, at 5 (explaining the
difference between securities that are "information sensitive" and securities that are
"information insensitive").
143. See generallyJohn M. Griffin & Dragon Yongjun Tang, Did Subjectivity Play a Role in CDO
Credit Ratings?, 67J. FIN. 1293, 1293-94 (2012).
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"adjustments" made by the rating agency. They found "that 84.6% of
adjustments are positive and that, on average, adjustments amount[ed] to an
additional... 18.2% by 2009."'45 More specifically, their findings show that
"[i]f CDOs had been structured to meet smaller AAA thresholds according
to the [rating agency]'s model, each CDO would have been $14.7 million
more costly to structure," and that re-characterizing the securities issued to
have ratings more in accord with those dictated by the model would have
16
cost investors $38.7 billion for the 916 CDOs in their sample. 4 They
further found that these adjustments cannot be explained by other factors,
like "manager experience [or] credit enhancements," and "that adjustments
to the rating agency model appear to have been harmful for future CDO
performance."147 In short, there is strong evidence that credit rating
agencies regularly used their discretion in a way that overstated the value of
the securities issued in CDO transactions. In so doing, they facilitated the
consummation of an excessive volume of CDO transactions, because a
precondition for any CDO transaction to proceed is that the amount that
investors are willing to pay for the securities issued exceeds the costs of the
underlying assets plus the fees associated with the transaction. Thus, by
increasing the amount investors would pay for the securities issued, the
rating agencies effectively increased the number of viable transactions.
Turning to consider why the rating agencies might have done this,
there is evidence that the agencies earned substantially more for rating these
complex securitization transactions than for other services they provided.
The portion of Moody's revenue that it received from rating structured
finance products like MBSs and CDOs, for example, increased fourfold
between 2ooo and 2007 and constituted approximately half of its total
rating revenue from 2005 through 2007.'48 Standard & Poor's revenue from
rating structured finance transactions similarly increased from less than
$200 million in 2002 to over $6oo million in 2006.,49 Additionally, there is
evidence that Moody's and other credit rating agencies enjoyed
extraordinarily high profit margins as a result.5o Coffee has suggested that
this profit incentive, and the rating agencies' desire to cultivate a favorable
reputation with investment banks structuring MBS and CDO transactions,
145.

Id.

146.

Id. at 1296.

147.

Id. at 1295-96.

INQUIRYREPORT, supranote 141, at 117; Coffee, supranote 67, at 410.
Thomas Catan, U.S. Steps Up S&P Inquiry: Former Analysts
Questioned Again on Mortgage-Bond Ratings, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 17, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/
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graphic).
150. According to one source, Moody's had the highest profit margin of any company in
the S&P 500 for five years in a row prior to the Crisis. Credit Rating Agencies and the Financial
Crisis: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 1 soth Cong. 2 (2oo8)
(statement of Hon. Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform).

1564

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98:1517

may well have outweighed the agencies' concerns about their long-term
reputation with investors.'1 Partnoy similarly argued that "[c]redit rating
agencies increasingly focus[ed] on structured finance and new complex
debt products" in part because those instruments "generate a substantial
share of credit rating agencies' revenues and profits" and that "[w]ith
respect to these new instruments, the agencies have become more like 'gate
openers' than gatekeepers.",52
Putting these patterns together, this is yet another illustration of fee
effects. The fees paid to the intermediaries-the credit rating agencieswere sufficiently excessive that it may have been rational for them to seek to
do as many transactions as possible, even to the point of using their
discretion to overstate the value of the securities issued. One result was the
proliferation of MBS and CDO transactions. That effect gave rise to others.
To understand the broader economic consequences, a little additional
background is needed. It just happens to be the case that the U.S.
government, through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, was at the forefront of
developing securitization structures; and, home loans were the sole type of
assets originally placed into these structures.'53 Not surprisingly, when
private market participants started to create securitization structures, they
too started with home loans. As a result, the securitization of home loans
continued to outpace the securitization of other debt instruments, even as
securitization structures became more accepted and more widely used.154 So,
when too many structured finance transactions were consummated, one
result was an influx of excess capital into the residential real estate market.55
As a result, the dynamics here described likely contributed to the parallel
bubbles in MBSs and CDOs, on one hand, and in the residential real estate
market, on the other.15 6 Thus, along with an array of other factors, these
dynamics may well have played a role in the greatest financial crisis and
recession since the Great Depression.
It is also worth noting some of the similarities between the Crisis and
the LBO boom. In both settings, an influential class of intermediaries had
the ability to earn excessively high fees in connection with a particular type
of transaction. For historically contingent reasons, that transaction type
tended to be used to funnel capital to a particular firm type or sector of the
economy. And, while the market eventually corrected itself, a notable (and
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153. Judge, supranote 68, at 670.
152.

154.

E.g., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON RISK

RETENTION 27 & n.2o, 28 & fig.2, 69 & fig.15 (2010), available at http://federalreserve.gov/

boarddocs/rptcongress/securitization/riskretention.pdf.
155. SeeJudge, supranote 68, at 67o-77, 693.
156. See id. at 6 93-94 (describing the relationship between the bubble in MBSs and CDOs
and the bubble in residential real estate).

2013]

FEE EFFECTS

1565

costly) bubble arose in the meantime. These examples suggest that when a
transaction type is linked to a particular type of firm or industry, and
influential financial intermediaries can earn excessive fees for producing a
particular financial product, the firm types and industries so funded may
well receive more capital than is optimal.
IV. RESPONSES

This Part explores the policy implications of fee effects. This analysis
takes two forms. It begins by recognizing that there are already many laws
and regulations in place aimed at reducing fee effects and showing how the
framework introduced here can help us to evaluate the efficacy of such
policies. It then considers some of the reasons that intervention may be
warranted, and proposes some approaches to reducing fee effects that may
be warranted in a number of domains.
While evaluating and advocating intervention in some settings, this
analysis also recognizes the need for regulators to proceed with caution in
their efforts to reduce fee effects. As Coase recognized, when choosing
among various alternative arrangements, we are inevitably making a choice
between options that are flawed in one way or another.57 That there are
costs associated with reliance upon intermediaries is thus, in itself, not a
sufficient basis for assuming that such arrangements are suboptimal. This is
particularly true in light of the significant cost savings and other advantages
that arise from reliance upon specialized intermediaries. Further, fee effects
may give rise to collateral benefits, like promoting particular types of
innovation, or enabling efficient institutional arrangements that would not
be sustainable otherwise. Economists have recognized, for example, that
pricing certain goods well above the marginal cost of production, such as
last-minute plane fares and popcorn in movie theaters, may be explained
based on a need to cover fixed costs, time costs, the costs of holding
inventories, and the like.5 8 Similarly, higher fees may enable intermediaries
to provide auxiliary services of real value to parties, and for which they
cannot easily charge directly.59 As such, there may be situations where there
are fee effects, yet because of technological and other constraints, a more
efficient equilibrium is not viable. Viewed in light of the challenge inherent
in trying to ensure that intermediaries are appropriately compensated for
their services, fee effects are better understood as descriptive facts arising
from reliance upon specialized intermediaries, than a problem to be solved.

157.

See supra note 41 and accompanying text.

158. See John R. Lott, Jr. & Russell D. Roberts, A Guide to the Pitfalls of Identifying Price
Discrimination,29 ECON. INQUIRY 14, 19-22 (1991).
159. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 896-97 (2007); see
also Rochet & Tirole, supra note 32, at 649-50 (demonstrating the limitations of the Coase
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A related and additional reason for regulatory caution is that the
operation of the underside of transaction fees, and the costs and benefits
that result, are inherently context-specific. Had structured financing not
been tied to a particular sector of the economy for historically contingent
reasons, for example, there would be no reason that the exceptional fees
intermediaries earned on creating such structures would have contributed
to the bubble in residential real estate. The types of tools available to
policymakers or market participants to address the adverse effects of the
underside of transaction fees will also vary dramatically across settings. These
considerations make it impossible to draw any broad normative conclusions
about what should be done in light of the underside of transaction fees. A
third reason for caution is that attempts to reduce the adverse effects of the
underside of transaction fees will almost inevitably be both under- and overinclusive, and will also be costly to implement. 6° For intervention to be
justified, it should not only reduce fee effects, but should do so by an
amount that exceeds the costs of intervention.
A.

PROHIBITION

Consumer protection is a common rationale for many policies currently
in place aimed at reducing fee effects. The class of financial intermediaries
that may well have the greatest amount of interaction with retail investors is
stockbrokers. Given the wide array of financial products available, many
individual investors choose to work with a stockbroker or financial adviser in
determining how to invest whatever wealth they have accumulated.
Stockbrokers traditionally have not been compensated directly for many of
the services that they provide to clients, such as providing advice about how
to structure a portfolio likely to achieve a client's financial objectives and the
risks associated with different investment options. Rather, stockbrokers
typically were compensated based upon a client's investment activity. While a
greater array of pricing schemes exist today, most stockbrokers (who often
now identify themselves as financial advisers) continue to be compensated
by collecting fees based upon the client's investment activity rather than
being paid directly for the services they provide.' 61 Putting to the side issues
of whether and how this is an efficient arrangement, it is clear that the
potential fee effects it creates are quite significant. Retail investors tend to
use stockbrokers precisely because they are uncertain about how to translate
their long-term financial goals into an investment plan, and the range of
options available today can easily seem overwhelming. Stockbrokers tend to
operate in a very competitive market, and reputation can play an important
role in a stockbroker's ability to retain clients and attract new ones, but

16o.

See infra Part [V.A.
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regulators long ago determined that these constraints were insufficient, in
themselves, to ensure stockbrokers consistently took actions that were in
their clients' best interests. This Subpart considers one of the most
identifiable ways that the underside of transaction fees may bias broker
recommendations, and it then evaluates efforts by regulators and market
participants to counter its effects.
A common scheme for compensating brokers, which had been
dominant and continues to persist, is for the broker to earn a commission
each time a client buys or sells shares of stock or other securities. As a result,
the broker's compensation increases with the frequency and size of his or
her client's trades. Seeking to protect investors, reasoning that at least some
were not capable of adequately protecting themselves, regulators responded
by prohibiting a particular type of activity-churning. Churning is "the
practice by a broker of advancing his own interest (his commissions based
on trading volume) without regard to his customer's objectives by a course
of trading which is excessive in light of the size and character of the
customer's account."' 62 Churning requires that (1) the broker had direct or
de facto control over the level of trading in the account, (2) the amount of
trading in the account was excessive, and (3) the broker acted with the
requisite state of mind (a finding which may be inferred from establishing
the first two elements).1 63 In the framework proposed here, a prohibition on
churning, enforced by imposing ex post liability on brokers found guilty of
churning (and at times limiting their ability to remain stockbrokers), alters
the internal constraints facing a stockbroker, deterring him from taking
actions that might be deemed churning by a court.
Altering a stockbroker's internal constraints in this manner has two
effects on social welfare. On one hand, it is likely to deter many socially
wasteful trades. A broker contemplating whether to engage in a trade that
would yield fees for the broker but which would not create actual value for
his client will be less inclined to do so to the extent he expects the trade (in
conjunction with others) might result in him being found liable for
churning. On the other hand, the prohibition on churning likely also chills
some socially valuable behavior. We can see how this might happen by
looking at the basis for a finding that the trading in an account is excessive.
"[E]xcessiveness is a subjective determination" that depends upon the
client's
wealth,
trading
objectives,
and
other context-specific
considerations.' 64 In making such a finding, a court may consider, among
other factors, the turnover rate, holding periods, the presence of particular
162.

Fey v. Walston & CO, 4 93F.2d 1036, 104O n.1 (7th Cir. 1974).
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trading patterns, and the rate of return that would be required to cover the
costs (including commissions), in light of the size of the account.' 65 Because
of the inherently imperfect nature of the inquiry, a broker exercising the
requisite level of control over a client's account may well decide, at times, to
engage in less trading than would be optimal for the client or to otherwise
alter the types of trades in which he engages in order to avoid activity that
too closely resembles the type that courts might find excessive.' 66 As a result,
some trades that should occur will not. Similarly, there may be
circumstances in which an investor would prefer to have his stockbroker
have complete discretion over his account, and such an arrangement would
be socially optimal, but the broker might nonetheless decline such control
based upon concerns that the client's investment goals would require
trading activity that might easily be mistaken as excessive. In each instance,
socially beneficial behavior is deterred. Another type of cost associated with
the ban on churning is the cost of enforcement. Enforcement costs include
the legal and other costs incurred by the parties and the tribunal each time a
case is brought irrespective of how it is resolved.
Banning churning, on net, may well be appropriate. Recent evidence
suggests that the more wealthy and sophisticated a client, the less likely he is
to give an intermediary complete discretion over his account.' 67 If
stockbrokers are particularly inclined to engage in excessive trading in the
accounts of their least sophisticated clients, because detection is less likely,
there is good reason to expect that the benefits of the ban far exceed the
costs. Nonetheless, because of the inevitably imperfect nature of
enforcement coupled with the probability that the line drawn will be both
over- and under-inclusive, such bans also tend to deter some socially valuable
activity. Similar dynamics are likely inevitable in most domains where
intermediaries are influential.
B.

OTHER RESPONSES

Despite the many reasons for caution, intervention by regulators and
market participants to reduce fee effects will at times be warranted. A
primary function of the capital markets is to allocate scarce resources among
different projects, ideally based upon the expected returns of each. When
capital is allocated for reasons other than the expected return on a project,
the distortions that result can be socially costly. Fee effects can lead to such
distortions. When certain firm types or sectors of the economy receive
capital through pathways that are particularly profitable for financial
165.
166.
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intermediaries to build, the underside of transaction fees can result in
excessive capital being allocated to those firms and sectors. At the extreme,
the underside of transaction fees may thus contribute to bubbles. A closely
related risk is that when firms or sectors are funded in ways that are less
profitable for intermediaries, those firms or sectors may receive less capital
than is socially optimal. Such deficiencies are harder to identify, and
potentially somewhat less costly. Nonetheless, if pervasive, the effect could
also give rise to real social costs, as value-creating projects are forgone for a
lack of capital. Thus, intervention may be warranted to counteract the
distortive effects of intermediary influence on the allocation of capital.
There are also other reasons to suspect that invention may at times be
cost justified. As illustrated above, concerns about consumer protection may
well merit intervention. In addition, the bundled nature of the decision to
work with an intermediary may limit the capacity of market forces to achieve
an optimal equilibrium without some regulatory assistance. Moreover, as I
show in other work, intermediaries often succeed in shaping institutional
arrangements in ways that increase and entrench their influence, thus
increasing the expected fee effects. 68 Finally, interventions to reduce fee
effects will at times take the form of reducing-rather than increasingregulation, as regulations currently protect intermediaries and accentuate
fee effects in a number of domains.16s
1.

Follow the Fees

One key lesson this Article holds is to follow the fees. Both policymakers
and market participants would be well served to better understand the
mechanisms through which intermediaries may seek to promote their
interest in higher fees and the environments in which they are likely to
succeed. For example, the follow-the-fees response may be an important tool
guiding regulators in how they choose to allocate finite resources. In both
case studies, the intermediaries involved were earning exceptionally high
fees in connection with certain types of transactions.170 Had regulators
viewed these high fees as a flag indicating the need for greater scrutiny, it is
possible that they would have been able to intervene in a timely fashion to
reduce, if not eliminate, the distortions that resulted. Similarly, the
exceptionally high fees that Arthur Andersen and other accounting firms
were earning by providing consulting services has been identified as a
significant factor contributing to their failures in their auditing roles; thus,
168. Judge, supra note 15, at 25.
169. See infra Part IV.B.2.
170. Sometimes, regulators will be in a position to readily determine the fees an
intermediary is earning in connection with particular transaction types relative to others. In
situations where this is not the case, indirect evidence-such as indications that an intermediary
is rapidly expanding a new division or re-allocating resources to it-may also be used as flags
signaling the need for further scrutiny.
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again, attention to fees may have alerted regulators to pay close heed to
their activities.'7' Particularly in areas where regulation or other institutional
arrangements give a class of intermediaries significant influence, there may
be significant value in using fees as an indicator suggesting that an
intermediary's practices in a particular area merit scrutiny.
Following the fees may also be a helpful guide for policymakers beyond
those with direct jurisdiction over the intermediary or transaction type at
issue. The Federal Reserve and the Financial Stability Oversight Council, for
example, have been charged with leading roles in the effort to maintain
systemic stability.172 Given the role that bubbles can play in contributing to
financial crises, it may well be appropriate for these regulatory bodies to
invest resources identifying critical intermediaries and understanding how
those intermediaries may use their influence in ways that alter how capital is
allocated. At a more granular level, examining the fees intermediaries earn
on various transaction types and how this affects the ways intermediaries use
their influence may help regulators to better understand the operation of
critical markets and forces that might disrupt their operation.
Similar benefits may accrue to market participants who become more
attuned to the underside of transaction fees. The more investors and others
understand about how the intermediaries on whom they rely are
compensated, the more adept they will be at seeking ways to reduce the
problematic aspects of the underside of transaction fees. Regulation may
have a role to play in helping to ensure that parties, ranging from
consumers to large institutional investors, have access to the information
they need to understand how an intermediary's recommendations may be
biased by transaction fees. For example, it may be appropriate for the Office
of Financial Education, a division of the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau, to devote additional resources to educating individuals about the
ways intermediaries' interests may deviate, in systematic ways, from the
parties they serve.7 The Office might also devote even more resources to its
efforts to improve disclosure requirements, focusing additional attention on
the degree to which the mandatory disclosure facilitates consumers' ability

171.

supra note 6, at 26-29.
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to discern the ways that the underside of transaction fees may be biasing an
intermediary's advice. One approach could be to require intermediaries to
provide greater information about how they are compensated, directly and
indirectly, and how the fees they will earn from the proposed transaction
differ from those they would earn on others that might be close substitutes
from the consumer's perspective, the latter element being critical and less
often required. Many reforms in this vein are already underway, but it is
likely that more could be undertaken and those already underway might be
improved if revised with the express aim of empowering consumers to
identify and combat fee effects. 174
2.

Improve Constraints to Better Align Incentives

The framework offered here reveals that the magnitude of fee effects is
determined by three related factors-the magnitude of the intermediary's
influence, and the robustness of the external and internal constraints on
how it exercises that influence. In so doing, the framework simultaneously
provides a roadmap for potential ways to reduce fee effects while minimizing
the new distortions regulations often introduce-reduce the intermediary's
influence or improve the strength of the internal or external constraints on
how it exercises that influence. This Subpart explores all three approaches.
a. Regulatory Restraint
One way to reduce intermediary influence is to reconsider regulatory
regimes that give rise to such influence. The credit rating agencies, for
example, achieved their influential role at least in part as a result of
regulatory and market-based rules that mandated or encouraged particular
types of firms to hold assets that had received a AAA or other designated
credit rating.,75 Regulators further protected their influence by requiring
the rating to come from a Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organization ("NRSRO") and allowing the market to be dominated by just
three firms-Moody's, Standard & Poor's, and Fitch.17 6 The influence of
other gatekeepers has been similarly entrenched into regulatory and other
institutional arrangements.177 In revealing that such regimes tend to
increase fee effects, a cost not previously examined, this Article suggests that
regulators should set a higher threshold for the anticipated benefits before
implementing a requirement that entrenches a class of intermediaries in this

174.

See, e.g.,
Ask CFPB, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/

askcfpb (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (describing some of the resources currently available).
175. Aline Darbellay & Frank Partnoy, Credit Rating Agencies Under the Dodd-Frank Act,
BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL'Y REP., Dec. 201 1, at 1,9 (explaining that in the years before the
Crisis, credit rating agencies "benefited from regulations that required the use of ratings").

176. Id. at 2 ("[T]hree leading rating agencies are responsible for 98 percent of all
outstanding ratings and collect go percent of the total rating revenue.").
177.
See supra Part II.A.
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fashion. Relatedly, lawmakers and regulators should reevaluate laws and
regulations already in place that require market participants to work with a
particular class of intermediaries or anoint a new gatekeeper. Some reforms
in this vein are already underway. The Dodd-Frank Act, for example,
requires all federal agencies to review and modify regulations that rely upon
credit ratings.17 It can be far more difficult to unwind such regulatory
protections than to forego their adoption, so the focus should likely be on
reducing implementation, but attempts to remove such protections merit
consideration.
b. Improve External Constraints
A second strategy is to improve the robustness of external constraints
on how intermediaries use their influence. As competition is often the most
powerful such constraint, improving competition may go a long way to
reducing fee effects.79 One approach entails devoting greater regulatory
resources to enforcing antitrust laws and other regimes designed to promote
competition, including closely scrutinizing mergers, when the parties
involved are intermediaries, particularly if they are in a position to influence
the movement of capital.,so There may also be times when regulators should
seek to promote competition in ways that go beyond antitrust. Baker and
Siegelman, for example, draw attention to the possibility that busting up
situational monopolies, like those that seem to facilitate the sale of excessive
and overpriced extended warranties, may help to address some of the
problems they identify.' s l Their analysis acknowledges the challenges of
implementation, and they suggest that more invasive forms of regulation
may continue to be warranted.112 Nonetheless, such interventions could at
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Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
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2011)).

179. Sensitivity to context is particularly important in such efforts given the questions about
the benefits and costs of heighted competition among certain classes of financial
intermediaries. See supra Part II.B.
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particular setting, that is, the elasticity of the demand curve an intermediary faces. POSNER,
supra note 95, at 1 1-12, 61-62 (2d ed. 2001); see also Kaplow, supranote 94, at 400.
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times be viable.' 8 3 By reducing the ability of intermediaries to earn
monopoly profits, such interventions would increase the robustness of the
external constraints on an intermediary's exercise of its influence, and
thereby increase the probability that the intermediary will make
recommendations and take other actions in line with the party's best
interest. Moreover, such interventions are less likely to introduce chilling
effects and other distortions.
c.

Improve Internal Constraints

Yet another alternative is to strengthen the internal constraints on an
intermediary's exercise of its influence. Rather than seeking to bluntly alter
such constraints, as rules banning certain types of behavior tend to do,
regulators could seek to improve the feedback mechanisms through which
an intermediary internalizes the positive and negative effects of its
recommendation. One way to do so would be to reduce the frictions that
impede the feedback mechanisms through which an intermediary's actions
affect its reputation. This might entail providing investors and other parties
with information that could help them to discern whether they received a
high-quality or low-quality recommendation. It could further entail the
promotion, creation, and viability of forums through which similarly situated
parties could learn from the experience of others. Specifics, again, have to
be worked out in a context-specific way. For intermediaries that serve retail
consumers, sites like Yelp or TripAdvisor might serve as a model. Such sites
might have the additional benefit of allowing parties to sort themselves by
"type," enabling users to give different weights to different reviews
depending upon the extent to which the qualitative basis for a reviewer's
assessment accurately reflects the party's own criteria. By contrast, in settings
where the parties' desire to protect their own reputations inhibits robust
information exchange, it may be appropriate for regulators to facilitate the
creation of forums that enable confidentiality, recognizing the verification,
and other issues that arise when identities are withheld.
While many review sites have arisen even in the absence of regulatory
intervention, that does not mean we have reached a socially optimal level.
Given the significant positive externalities that can flow from such sites, the
failure of market forces to create effective equivalents in the financial realm
by no means proves that the benefits would not far exceed the costs. In light
of the collective action challenges facing parties, and the preference by

YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 289, 293-94 (2007) ("[A] disclosure requirement in consumer insurance
markets is unlikely to address meaningfully the core risk of contingent commissions-the
potential for inefficient steering.").

183. Baker & Siegelman, supra note 52, at 34-36, 57-6o (explaining the approach and
identifying a proposal in this vein provided in Marieke Huysentruyt & Daniel Read, How Do
People Value Extended Warranties?Evidence from Two Field Surveys, 40 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTy 197
(2010), and discussing why that proposal is unlikely to work).
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many classes of intermediaries to limit transparency, intervention may be
8
important to spur the creation and maintenance of effective review sites. 4
Additionally, certain structures, particularly ones that would hinge upon a
mandatory reporting requirement or which would seek to maintain
confidentiality, would likely require government coordination, at least
initially. Nonetheless, like the other policies proposed here, such
intervention would be of the "light-touch" variety, seeking more to facilitate
than impede market forces. They may thus be a valuable additional tool in
combating fee effects, and one that the government has under-utilized to
date.
Many of the responses here proposed are relatively modest. This is in
part because even modest responses, appropriately implemented, could
meaningfully reduce fee effects in a number of domains or alter regulatory
regimes already in place to the same effect. The proposed reforms, however,
are far from exhaustive. Taking the dynamism of institutional arrangements
into account, and the ways that intermediaries may use their informational,
positional, and other advantages to alter those arrangements in ways that
artificially augment their influence, may well justify more radical steps to
reduce that influence or the fee effects that flow from it.,s5
CONCLUSION

This Article shows that an under-examined market force-the
underside of transaction fees-plays a first-order role in shaping the mix of
transactions that occur in the capital markets. This gives rise to a cost, in the
form of a foregone gain, whenever intermediaries have influence and the
constraints on how they exercise that influence are imperfect. While the
optimal level of fee effects is probably not zero, the magnitude of these
effects today are far greater than is socially optimal. By drawing attention to
fee effects and providing a framework for understanding when they are
likely to arise, this Article lays the ground for further investigation of how fee
effects manifest in different industries. The Article thus suggests that
regulators, market participants, and academics should "follow the fees," so
we can better understand and reduce these effects.

184. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY
8
(1971) (explaining why mass media social pressure is "probably not
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ordinarily sufficient by itself" to spur the creation of review sites).
185. Judge, supra note 15.

